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ABSTRACT 
 Political tolerance (the willingness to extend civil liberties to disliked groups) has 
been disturbingly low among the American public since measurement of tolerance 
began in the 1950’s. The few voters who do exhibit tolerant attitudes tend to be people 
who know a great deal about politics (i.e. people high in “political expertise”).  
Researchers have theorized many explanations for why political experts are more 
tolerant on average; for example, experts may place more value on the legal and 
normative ‘rules’ of democracy (i.e. “democratic norms”), which guarantee free speech, 
or they may consider democratic norms to be more important than non-experts do, or 
some other related mechanism may drive the effect. While many explanations for this 
link between expertise and tolerance have been suggested, none have been directly 
tested in empirical research. 
 The present dissertation represents the first set of studies examining how 
political expertise promotes political tolerance. Three studies will examine possible 
mechanisms: study one will examine the role of explicit support for democratic norms 
and perceived importance of such norms; study two will examine the accessibility of 
democratic values; and study three will examine implicit support for democratic values. 
Interactions between these predictors will also be tested a priori (for example, not only 
will explicit support and importance of democratic norms be examined individually, 
 xi 
 
the interaction of the two will also be analyzed as a mechanism).  These studies will 
inform future theory and experimental research on the causes of (and contributors to) 
tolerance, and will inform policy recommendations on how to increase tolerance in a 
generally intolerant public.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
 The present studies will examine the relationship between political expertise and 
political tolerance, and will examine several possible underlying mechanisms for the oft-
demonstrated effect of expertise on tolerance. First, this paper will briefly define 
political tolerance and provide a review of landmark political tolerance studies and 
findings, will outline the political psychological literature on key predictors of tolerance, 
including political expertise, and will discuss the role of democratic norms and values in 
the development and endorsement of tolerance. Further, this paper will suggest several 
possible underlying mechanisms or mediators of the effect of expertise on political 
tolerance: endorsement of democratic norms, accessibility of democratic norms, 
internalization of democratic norms, and democratic norms importance. After outlining 
a theoretical case for why these variables may undergird the relationship between 
expertise and tolerance, this paper will propose a series of three studies testing all four  
simple mediational pathways, as well as three moderated mediational models, each of 
which tests mediation by the interaction between two of the aforementioned 
mediators.  Survey methods, proposed statistical treatments, and potential implications 
of this research will be discussed. 
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Political Tolerance: Background 
 "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."  
This absolute-free-speech sentiment, first reportedly expressed by Voltaire (1770), has 
long been held as a democratic ideal of paramount importance (Jefferson, 1944; Prothro 
& Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964; Mill, 1869). In reality, most Americans are not willing to 
fight and die for unpopular speech; indeed they will not even tacitly allow controversial 
public displays and protests (Stouffer, 1955). This disparity between ideal and fact was 
first observed in a landmark political tolerance study by political scientist Samuel 
Stouffer, and has vexed political theorists and scientists ever since. 
   In survey and experimental studies, political tolerance is typically defined as "an 
individual's willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes" 
(Crick, 1973; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982). Across decades of inquiry and using a 
variety of dependent measures, political scientists and psychologists have replicated 
Stouffer's basic finding: the American public is massively intolerant (McClosky & Brill, 
1983; Prothro& Grigg, 1960; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The 
psychological underpinnings of tolerance (or rather, mass intolerance) thus demand 
scientific inquiry. 
Definition 
Political tolerance has historically been defined by political theorists and social 
scientists alike as individual democratic citizens’ willingness to permit or allow civil 
liberties to be extended to objectionable groups or offensive (but innocuous) ideas 
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(Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982; Crick, 1973). While the specific issue 
of which rights constitute “civil liberties” may vary by country, in the United States 
tolerance typically refers to civil liberties granted in the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution, particularly non-religious rights that pertain to freedom of speech and 
expression (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; McClosky, 1964). These rights include freedom of 
speech (both literal and symbolic, in the form of attire or behavior), freedom of 
assembly, freedom to protest the government, freedom of the press, and freedom to 
petition (U.S. Const. art. I).  
 In terms of political theory and psychology, political tolerance represents a 
respect for the procedural norms of the democratic process, as well as belief that the 
laws of a country should be applied equally to all members of society—including those 
who are deemed personally repellant.  In addition, tolerance represents a willingness to 
overlook one’s initial prejudices against a group or idea, and allow that group or idea to 
be expressed in the public sphere without suppression—in this way, the expression of 
tolerance attitudes may be psychologically similar to other forms of effortful bias or 
prejudice suppression (e.g. Devine, 1989; Lepore& Brown, 2002).  
It should also be emphasized, however, that permitting a group to exercise its 
free speech rights does not imply a change in anti-group attitude on the part of the 
tolerant individual—in fact, tolerance is almost exclusively defined by the willingness to 
extend free speech rights in the presence of active distaste for the group or idea being 
expressed (Sullivan et al, 1982). Sullivan et al (1979) perhaps best expressed this 
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contingency of tolerance in their landmark book Political Tolerance and American 
Democracy: “Tolerance implies a willingness to ‘put up with’ those things one rejects or 
opposes. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests 
one opposes.” (p.2). 
History of Research on Political Tolerance 
 The umbrella term “political tolerance” and the academic study of the construct 
gained intellectual currency in the 1950s, with the publication of Samuel Stouffer’s 
seminal work, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (1955; Hazama, 2010).In the 
spring of 1954, Stouffer and colleagues surveyed the tolerance attitudes of a stratified 
sample of 4,933 United State citizens from wide swathes of the country, including 
political elites and individuals at all education and SES levels. Respondents were 
assessed for their general, abstract support for free speech rights, and were then asked 
whether communists, socialists, and atheists should be permitted to engage in the 
following free speech acts: teaching in public schools, publishing books to be held in the 
local libraries, holding public speeches, and working freely at a job in the community.  
 Stouffer’s results were troubling: while the vast majority of respondents 
supported the notion of tolerance in the abstract (roughly 90% or more in most groups), 
a majority denied speech rights to all three target groups (with one-third or fewer 
providing tolerant responses; Stouffer, 1955). Stouffer noted several factors that 
appeared to promote tolerance, most of which have been frequently replicated in later 
studies, using a variety of methods: education, political activism, living in an urban area, 
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experience with diversity, and political elite status (being either an elected official or a 
community leader with experience and agency in politics). Of these predictors, Stouffer 
found the largest effect was that of education, and he considered the effect of 
education on tolerance to be paramount. Stouffer theorized that education made 
individuals more tolerant by not only exposing them to a wide variety of diverse ideas 
(some correct, some not), but also by providing a strong instruction in the norms and 
values of the democratic system. He theorized that political elites were more tolerant 
for the same reasons— they experienced high exposure to a variety of perspectives, and 
had a high incentive to accept and internalize democratic values. Notably, political 
ideology and party were not strong predictors of tolerance, a pattern that would 
continue to be replicated in further research. 
 Stouffer’s revelation that the majority of the American public was massively 
intolerant inspired a flurry of research and concern. McClosky (1964) and Prothro and 
Grigg (1960) soon replicated Stouffer’s general finding that people support equal free 
speech rights theoretically but blanch once a target group or example of a particular 
free speech act is provided. Later replications by some of the same researchers found 
this result again on a new cohort of respondents (McClosky & Brill, 1983). Research also 
replicated all of Stouffer’s key predictors of greater tolerance, particularly the value of 
education and political involvement and expertise (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Jackman, 
1972; Nunn et al, 1978). Again, regardless of ideology or partisanship, people who were 
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engaged and knowledgeable about politics were vastly more likely to provide a tolerant 
response, as were the more educated.  
 Seeing the link between education and political knowledge and tolerance, 
Stouffer (1955) anticipated that, as educational opportunities increased for younger 
generations, so too would tolerance for objectionable groups. Seeking to test this 
hypothesis, Davis (1975) analyzed survey data collected by the National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) in 1972 and found significantly higher tolerance from Stouffer’s 
original sample. Nunn et al (1978) reported similar increases in tolerance (while again 
replicating the effects of education and political elitehood) several years later, using 
another NORC survey. Several other political scientists reported similar apparent 
increases in tolerance across this period (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996).  
However, despite increases in education for younger cohorts, both Nunn et al 
(1978) and Davis (1975) found increased tolerance across all cohort groups, including 
older adults and individuals with less education. Lawrence (1976) criticized this apparent 
maturational effect by noting a clear problem in all prior studies’ use of a limited 
number of target groups: since Stouffer (1955), every tolerance researcher had 
examined tolerance for communists, socialists, and atheists, and attitudes towards 
those target groups had shifted in the past two decades. A new method of measuring 
tolerance was desperately needed. 
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Trends in Measurement of Tolerance 
 All large-scale studies of political tolerance from Stouffer’s (1955) to Nunn et al 
(1978) used the same target groups for all participants (communists, socialists, and 
atheists).  All three target groups were liberal in ideology, and were rapidly becoming 
more accepted by society during the period that tolerance was observed to “increase”. 
Thus, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) set out to formulate a new measure of 
political tolerance that would be ideology-neutral and responsive to the attitudes of the 
individual survey taker.  
 Sullivan et al (1982) argued that granting free speech rights to a group only 
qualified as political tolerance in cases where the target group was actually disliked. 
Thus, asking a far-left voter if he or she would allow a “socialist” to speak might 
frequently be meaningless as a measure of tolerance, since the voter might have no 
hatred for the socialist or socialist messages that needed to be suppressed in order to 
provide a tolerant response. At the very least, individuals are more likely to provide a 
tolerant response to a target group they only mildly dislike when compared to a group 
they like least of all (Gibson, 1985). Theoretically, a ‘tolerant’ response is typically 
considered  to only be possible when the target group (or speech) in question is 
distasteful to the voter, otherwise speech isn’t being permitted or tolerated so much as 
passively accepted (see Gibson, 1992). Thus, if public opinion on Stouffer’s target groups 
changed over time (which it demonstrably did; Sullivan et al, 1982) to the point where 
socialists, communists, and atheists were no longer strongly reviled, the existing 
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tolerance measure could not be said to be truly capturing tolerance, particularly if there 
remained another, unexamined target group to which participants would provide a less 
tolerant response than they provided for Stouffer’s groups (Gibson, 2005). Furthermore, 
all of Stouffer’s (1955) target groups were left-leaning, inserting an ideological bias into 
the measure that could lead to more apparently intolerant responses in conservatives. 
One previous study (Herson & Hofstetter, 1975) had attempted to correct for this bias 
by asking participants about the free speech rights of one left-wing and one right-wing 
group, but Sullivan et al (1982) instead proposed that it was necessary to ensure that 
respondents actively disliked the target group they were being asked about before 
tolerance could be meaningfully assessed.  
 Hence, Sullivan et al (1982) created perhaps the most frequently-used measure 
of political tolerance, the content-controlled measure of tolerance, which remains in use 
today. In this measure, participants are able to select their own target group, using what 
the authors called the least-liked procedure: participants are provided with a list of 
groups in politics that are frequently disliked, and are instructed to select the one they 
like the least. The subsequent tolerance question stems are then filled in to the survey 
item stems, to make the survey items pertain to the group that the participant selected 
(e.g. “Members of the _____ should be banned from holding public office.”). The 
possible least-liked groups range from the KKK to pro- and anti-abortionists, to fascists 
and communists, and participants are permitted to select an alternate group that is 
unlisted as well.  
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Using this measure, Sullivan et al (1979, 1982) found that tolerance had not, in 
fact, increased since the 1950s; when ensuring that the target group was one 
respondents strongly disliked, the majority of the American public remained intolerant.  
Research using this measure also replicated many of Stouffer and others’ findings 
regarding the factors that predicted tolerance: expertise, acceptance of democratic 
norms, education, and political involvement all predicted tolerance, whereas ideology 
did not, for example.  The validity of Sullivan et al’s (1982) measure became widely 
apparent and was adopted by many others soon after. This measure of political 
tolerance has since been used in a wide variety of survey and experimental studies, and 
is frequently used in contemporary research. 
 Popular alternatives to Sullivan et al’s (1982) content-controlled measure of 
political tolerance include Gibson and Bingham’s (1982) measure, as well as the 
tolerance for diversity items in the World Values Survey (WVS) and the tolerance items 
in the annual General Social Survey (GSS). Since all three measures are also frequently 
used in the tolerance literature, they merit some discussion. Rather than controlling the 
content of questions to ensure that the target group is one the respondent dislikes (and 
using that target group throughout), Gibson and Bingham’s (1982) questions present 
respondents with a variety of civil liberties scenarios, with target groups that differ item-
by-item(e.g. “A radio station, which permits the reading of an anti-Semitic poem over 
the air should have its FCC license revoked.”), with some items specifying no target 
group whatsoever (e.g. “In their fight against crime the police should be entitled to use 
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wiretaps and other devices for listening in on private conversations.”). This measure, 
then, may be closer to Stouffer’s original “abstract” measures, which probe for general, 
notional support for tolerance more so than actual tolerance in practice. However, 
tolerance research using this measure has frequently replicated the same pattern of 
results found using alternate measures, including those of Stouffer (1955) and Sullivan 
et al (1982): the key constructs that typically predict tolerance (education, political 
expertise, support for democratic norms, and so on) do so regardless of measure (see 
Gibson, 1992, for an extensive review; Bobo & Licari, 1989).  
 In addition to the Gibson and Bingham (1982) and Sullivan et al (1982) measures, 
tolerance is assessed slightly differently in the World Value Survey and the General 
Social Survey. First, it should be noted that while the WVS is a widely-distributed 
international survey administered to an immensely wide swathe of people living in a 
variety of cultures, social-economic strata, and governmental systems, its definition of 
tolerance is too lax to be useful for the typical researcher examining political tolerance 
in a developed or longstanding democracy. The WVS’s tolerance questions ask 
respondents, for example, if homosexuality is ever “justified” (with options of “always 
justified”, “sometimes justified”, “rarely justified”, and “never justified”; Corneo& 
Jeanne, 2009). Similar questions exist for racial minorities and people of religions that 
differ from the respondent. In this way, while the WVS may be a very fruitful measure 
for those studying general tolerance for diversity in developing nations, its utility is 
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limited for those who are interested in studying tolerance that goes beyond the mere 
right for a target group to exist.  
 The General Social Survey, however, operationalizes tolerance in a manner more 
similar to Stouffer’s (1955) framework and is useful as a point of comparison with other 
measures used in the US and Western Europe. The GSS uses an eighteen-item measure 
of tolerance, which inquires about the rights of six target groups (communists, atheists, 
homosexuals, militarists, Muslims, and racists) and three free speech rights (the right to 
hold a public speech, the right to teach a college, and the right to place books in the 
library; Davis, 1975; Postic,2011). These tolerance items have been collected on a 
stratified sample of the American public annually since 1975, and while some of the 
target groups are rapidly becoming irrelevant (e.g., most people support free speech for 
LGBT people), the general pattern of results has consistently held, and confers with the 
findings reported using other methods: education, political elite status, political 
expertise, and support for democratic values all positively predict tolerance, regardless 
of target group (Gibson, 1992; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Chandler & Tsai, 2001). 
Key Determinants of Tolerance 
 It is clear that across a variety of measures, a number of common trends in 
political tolerance can be consistently found (Gibson, 1992). In developing and 
presenting a theoretical framework of tolerance and its most fundamental 
determinants, it is useful to review these landmark predictors, some of which will be 
included in the present set of studies. The key, frequently-replicated determinants of 
12 
 
 
 
tolerance can be grouped into two subcategories: predictors or determinants of 
tolerance that deal with the respondent’s attitudes toward the target group (i.e. the 
group being either tolerated or not tolerated), and predictors that have to deal with the 
psychological or political traits of the survey respondent him or herself.  
 Target-group-based determinants of tolerance. As the work of Sullivan et al 
(1982) made clear, much of what determines whether a survey respondent will provide 
a tolerant or intolerant judgment depends on the respondent’s feelings about the target 
group.  Under most contemporary theoretical frameworks of political tolerance, a 
tolerant judgment can only be made when the target group is hated or disliked by the 
individual responding; however, in the presence of such target-group hatred the 
majority of individuals are demonstrably intolerant (see Kuklinski et al., 1992 & 1993, for 
related evidence). The respondents’ relationship to the target group is thus a strong 
predictor of tolerance in and of itself. Since Sullivan et al’s landmark book introducing 
the least-liked tolerance procedure, many tolerance researchers have examined various 
other aspects pertaining to how an individual feels about the target group whose civil 
liberties are being discussed, and have found several recurring strong predictors.  
 Magnitude of dislike or hatred of group. First, the intensity with which a person 
hates the target group is a strong predictor of their level of tolerance for the group. 
While Sullivan et al (1982) and all researchers using Sullivan et al’s least-liked measure 
of tolerance could be certain that the target group whose civil liberties were being 
judged was, in fact, disliked by the respondent, there are still observable individual 
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differences in the degree to which the respondent hates the target group.  Sullivan et al 
(1982) even found an effect of level of dislike on tolerance in their initial spate of 
studies, with more hate predicting higher intolerance. Gibson (1992; 1989b) asked 
participants about their tolerance for not only their least-liked group, but their second, 
third and fourth least-liked groups, and found that there was far greater intolerance for 
the more intensely disliked targets.  In addition, the more a target group is seen as a 
violator of social mores and norms, the less tolerant respondents typically are of that 
group’s free speech rights (Marcus et al, 1995; Gibson & Gouws, 2003).  
Threatingness of group. Another strong determinant of individuals’ political 
tolerance judgments is their perception of the target group as a social (rather than 
personal) threat.  The more a political group is perceived to challenge society’s values or 
pose a risk to the public or to the respondents’ way of life, the more likely the 
respondent is to provide an intolerant response (Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Huddy et al, 
2005; Shamir, 1991; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Davis & Silver, 2004; Sullivan et al, 1993). 
This may even explain, in part, why tolerance for Stouffer’s original target groups has 
increased over time: people have become more comfortable with communists, 
socialists, and atheists in a post-Red Scare, post-Berlin wall era where these groups are 
not looming specters. Similarly, Davis and Silver (2004) demonstrated that respondents 
were less tolerant of target groups when the target groups were framed as societal 
threats; personal threat did not influence tolerance in this case. Outside of the United 
States, McIntosh et al (2005) reported that a key determinant of tolerance for 
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Bulgarians and Romanians was respondents’ perception of the target groups (ethnic 
minority groups in the region) as threatening to the majority and to the homeland.  
Sullivan et al (1982) also noted that the target groups toward which respondents were 
the most intolerant were those that actively advocated violence and rebellion, or had a 
history of participating in violent and revolutionary acts, which could be presumed to 
contribute to how threatening a least-liked group is perceived to be.  
Political power or influence of group. In addition to participants’ dislike of the 
target group and their perceptions of the target group as dangerous to society, another 
crucial target-based determinant of tolerance is whether the target has the potential for 
political influence. In a dissertation examining differences in tolerance across multiple 
nations, Hutchinson (2007) noted that one international predictor of tolerance was the 
influence the target group had over the nation’s existing political structures; in nations 
where strongly disliked groups had the actual potential of overtaking the government or 
being elected into office, respondents were far less tolerant of those groups’ civil 
liberties.  In addition, some research demonstrates that tolerance is lower for disliked 
groups that have actually been elected into office (or have access to channels of political 
influence) than for disliked groups that pose an external social threat and have little 
power (Shamir 1991; Gibson and Gouws 2003; but see Marcus et al, 1995).  
Again, this makes sense in light of Sullivan et al’s (1982) findings, as well as the 
illusory increases in tolerance for Stouffer’s target groups. First, Sullivan et al (1979, 
1982) found the highest tolerance levels among participants who selected the John 
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Birch Society and fascists. These groups had no actionable political influence at the time 
of the authors’ studies; so much so that it was (and is) hard to fathom members of such 
groups being elected to office or swaying public opinion. Therefore, the actual 
sociotropic risks posed by such groups expressing their views in the public sphere are 
relatively small. Similarly, tolerance has increased for Stouffer’s (1955) target groups 
(communists, socialists, and atheists) as fear of communism and the international 
political influence of communism has decreased. Thus, tolerance is not only influenced 
by how strongly a respondent hates the group being considered, or by how distasteful 
or threatening the group’s views are, but also by whether the group has any true 
influence on society or politics.  
 Respondent-based determinants of tolerance. Survey and experimental 
research has also consistently revealed a number of predictors of tolerance that occur at 
the respondent level. These predictors have been replicated in numerous political 
tolerance studies using a variety of sampling methods and measures, including the least-
liked measure of political tolerance as well as more general measures such as the GSS, 
Gibson and Bingham’s (1982), and the world value survey. Respondent-based 
determinants of tolerance include psychological and personality trait variables that are 
relatively unchanging within participants (such as authoritarianism), as well as social and 
experiential trait variables that can alter with life experience or across development 
(such as education or political involvement).  
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 Psychological trait variables. Survey and experimental research has outlined a 
bevy of personality factors that influence how readily a person tolerates groups they 
find abhorrent. Among personality factors, low self-esteem, high neuroticism and low 
openness to experience have all been linked to low political tolerance (Marcus et al, 
1995, Sullivan et al, 1982). Other individual differences such as authoritarianism have 
also been linked to tolerance, with more authoritarian and right-wing authoritarian 
participants displaying far less tolerance than average (Gibson, 1987; Adorno et al, 1950; 
Stouffer, 1955; McCloskey and Brill, 1983; Peffley and Sigelman, 1990; Feldman 2003, 
2005). A variety of situational threat manipulations have also demonstrably lowered 
individuals' political tolerance (Chanley, 1994; Theiss-Morse, 1993). 
 Political elite status. Political elites and individuals who hold political office are 
more tolerant than members of the mass public (McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Brill, 
1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955). Samuel Stouffer 
hypothesized that people who were involved in politics were better informed about 
society's core democratic values than average, and were more motivated to uphold 
them. As a result, such elites were capable of pausing and taking a "sober second 
thought" when faced with an objectionable group; he argued that this thoughtful pause 
afforded elites greater tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). With this argument Stouffer 
essentially suggested that tolerance judgments were psychologically similar to other 
forms of bias correction (Devine, 1989; Wegener &Petty, 2001; Lepore& Brown, 2002). 
In addition, Sullivan and colleagues (1993) have found evidence that political elite status 
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predicts increased tolerance in several multi-national samples (including the U.S., Great 
Britain, and New Zealand; this appears to be true in Israeli samples as well; Sullivan et al 
1985, Gibson, 1998) and are less likely to exhibit “slippage” from abstract support for 
civil liberties to support for the rights of specific targets (Sullivan & Transue, 1999).  
 Patriotism. A large body of research on national pride demonstrates that 
extreme levels of  national pride (in the form of nationalism) can lead to intolerance in 
the form of outgroup derogation,  outgroup hostility, and prejudice (Van Evera, 
1994;Feshbach, 1994; Blank & Schmidt, 1993, 1997; Kosterman Feshbach, 1989). 
Patriotism, however,  is a level of more modest (but not low) national pride, and is 
associated with commitment to maintaining the group’s standards, including increased 
commitment to democratic values and maintenance of group standards (Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, &Wetherell, 1987; Brewer, 1999; 2009 Noelle-Neumann & Kocher, 
1987; Topf, Mohler, Heath, &Trompeter, 1990). 
 Participation and activism. Another robust finding in the political tolerance 
literature is that activists and people who participate frequently in politics are more 
tolerant than members of the mass public (McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Brill, 1983; 
McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955). Samuel Stouffer 
hypothesized that people who were involved in politics were better informed about 
society's core democratic values than average, and were more motivated to uphold 
them. As a result, such elites were capable of pausing and taking a "sober second 
thought" when faced with an objectionable group; he argued that this thoughtful pause 
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afforded elites greater tolerance (Stouffer, 1955). With this argument Stouffer 
essentially suggested that tolerance judgments were psychologically similar to other 
forms of bias correction (Devine, 1989; Wegener & Petty, 2001; Lepore& Brown, 2002). 
Stouffer’s sample did in fact find that higher levels of political involvement and 
engagement promoted tolerance (1955); more recent research by Peffley and 
Rohrschneider (2003) provides even stronger support for the positive relationship 
between involvement and tolerance, particularly for unconventional forms of 
participation (such as protesting) that require the exercise of civil liberties to express 
dissent, in contrast to more conventional and uncontested forms of participation (such 
as voting).  
Education. One possible reason that elites, experts, and activists are more 
tolerant is that they tend to be better-educated (Sullivan et al, 1982). Controlling for 
political involvement, more years of education typically spell greater tolerance (Prothro 
& Grigg, 1960; Sniderman, 1984). Noting this pattern in his data, Stouffer hypothesized 
the mediating role of diversity of experience: the educated have more exposure to a 
variety of individuals, he argued, and through this exposure learn how to peacefully 
coexist with different others. This explanation for elite tolerance has generally not held 
over time, however—political knowledge and experience have been found to be highly 
confounded with education, instead (Sullivan et al, 1982; Bobo & Licari, 1989). 
Relatedly, an international study by Duch and Gibson (1992) suggested that education 
does not always promote greater tolerance; Zaller (1992) explained these findings by 
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positing that education only furnishes tolerance when it provides students with contact 
to unfamiliar groups and views (and thus that mere gains in cognitive ability or general 
knowledge are not sufficient to boost tolerance). Several alternate hypothesis 
accounting for the relationship between education and tolerance remain in need of 
testing, particularly the hypothesis that both political elite status and education increase 
commitment to democratic norms, which may itself lead to a more absolute-free-
speech, tolerant view (McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 
1978).In developing Eastern European countries, increases in education over the past 
twenty years has not brought with it related increases in tolerance (Hodson et al, 1994; 
Coenders & Scheepers, 2003), which researchers have interpreted as a sign that 
democratic values must first permeate through the cultural and educational system and 
be broadly accepted before education can prompt tolerance (see below for more on the 
influence of democratic values).  
 Expertise. One of the most robust and oft-replicated findings in the political 
tolerance literature is that individuals who are highly informed and sophisticated in the 
realm of politics are far more likely to express tolerance (Cacioppo et al, 1996; Zaller, 
1990; Krosnick, 1990; Golebiowska, 1999; Price & Ottati, 2012). Relatedly, Duch and 
Gibson (1992) and others (Powell, 1986; Lijphart, 1968) also note that individuals high in 
political sophistication (a construct highly related to, and probably synonymous with, 
political expertise; Lawrence, 2003; Delli-Karpini& Keeter, 1993; Krosnick, 1990) are 
higher in tolerance as well.  This tendency for political experts to be tolerant appears to 
20 
 
 
 
be ingrained: Marcus et al (1995) call political expertise a “predisposition” to tolerance, 
and expert tolerance may even be relatively automatic (see Price & Ottati, 2012; 
Hazama, 2010). In fact, one of the frequently-presented explanations for why political 
elite status (and political involvement) predicts tolerance is because the politically elite 
have a greater knowledge of politics and the “rules of the game” overall (Sullivan et al, 
1993; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Jackman (1978), in a reanalysis of Stouffer’s original 
data noted that most of the difference between elite and nonelite respondents on 
tolerance could be accounted for by differences in political knowledge (Sullivan et al, 
1993).  
Knowledge about politics seems to lead individuals to have greater respect for 
equal protection of civil liberties regardless of group. This may occur because political 
experts have greater support for democratic values; alternatively, this may occur 
because democratic values are more accessible to experts than novices when forming a 
tolerance judgment, because experts have internalized democratic values to a greater 
degree,  or because they consider democratic values to be more important than novices 
do, and thereby assign it more weight when forming their decision (Krosnick, 1990; 
McClosky & Brill, 1983; see below for a more complete list). The exact nature of the 
mechanism by which experts are more tolerant than novices has been frequently 
theorized but hasn’t been directly tested, though many theorize  that political experts’ 
higher support for democratic values is involved (Stouffer,1955; McClosky, 1964; 
McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Price & Ottati, 2012). 
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 Support for democratic norms and values. Research on political tolerance 
suggests that commitment to democratic norms (hereafter used interchangeably with 
“support for democratic values”), predicts tolerance for disliked groups (Bobo & Licari, 
1989; Gibson, 1993).Support for democratic norms theoretically includes the following: 
support for democracy as the ideal governmental system, support for procedural 
fairness, equality under the law, and support for pluralistic representation (Hutchinson, 
2007; Sullivan et al, 1982; Sniderman, 1996).Sniderman (1996) argues that support for 
democratic values is similar theoretically to the ‘abstract’ tolerance measured by 
Stouffer’s (1955) group-free measures. However, he and others (e.g. Hutchinson, 2007; 
Peffley et al, 2001) also argue that support for democratic values and tolerance are 
themselves distinct constructs despite this overlap, as support for democratic values 
reflects general philosophical respect for the “rules of the [political] game”, whereas 
political tolerance is the ability to actually uphold these rules in the most difficult (and 
specific) instances. To clarify, Sniderman (1996) refers to intolerance as a ‘failure’ to 
apply democratic norms to the question of whether a particular group has the right to 
engage in a particular form of speech. Thus, support for democratic norms can be seen 
as a necessary but insufficient condition for tolerance: it helps explain and predict 
tolerance, but is not synonymous with tolerance, as many individuals who support 
democratic values in the abstract do not uphold it consistently when provided specifics.  
While they are related but distinct concepts, support for democratic values is 
among the strongest and most consistently-observed predictors of tolerance 
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(Hutchinson, 2007; Sullivan et al, 1982, Gibson, 1996; 1998; Gibson and Gouws, 2003; 
Marcus et al 1995; and Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003).  This effect holds in 
international samples as well (Duch and Gibson, 1992). The relationship between 
support for democratic norms and political tolerance has also been found using a variety 
of measures of tolerance, both ‘least-liked’ and otherwise, indicating a robust effect 
(Gibson, 1992; Sullivan et al, 1985). Some evidence suggests that people who support 
democratic values are also more likely to maintain tolerance consistently (Sullivan & 
Transue, 1999; Lawrence, 1976; Sullivan et al, 1982; Gibson & Bingham, 1983; McClosky 
& Brill, 1983; Gibson 1987; 1992). Choosing to tolerate the views of a despised group 
inherently involves a tradeoff between values, and pits democratic norms against 
practical concerns such as cost, political correctness, and safety (Hutchinson, 2007; 
Sullivan et al, 1982). Since tolerance judgments involve such a plentitude of competing 
considerations, reminding participants of the possible negative consequences of free 
speech (e.g. riots, political influence, public offense) can frequently make them less 
tolerant  (see, e.g. Kuklinski et al 1991; 1993). However, survey respondents who 
strongly support democratic norms are far less likely to make this tradeoff, and hence 
are the most likely to remain resolutely tolerant, even in the face of a truly hated or 
potentially dangerous group, or even a prime that makes riots and dangerous 
consequences more accessible (Nelson et al, 1997).  
Not surprisingly, support for democratic values is associated with political 
expertise, and may even account for the oft-noted relationship between expertise and 
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tolerance (Radin, 2006; Jones, 1979). The exact nature of the relationship between 
democratic values, political expertise, and tolerance currently remain unknown and 
untested, however, and make up the fundamental question of the present set of 
studies. The impact of democratic values on tolerance may even help account for the 
relationship between political elite status and tolerance, as political elites are more 
likely to value the governmental processes of which they are a part, and are more likely 
to see themselves and democratic standard-bearers (Stouffer, 1955; Gibson & Bingham, 
1983; Gibson, 1987; Lawrence, 1976; McClosky & Brill, 1983). Elites and activists 
generally have high commitment to democratic norms, and may therefore appear more 
tolerant than non-elites because their attitudes toward civil liberties are more accessible 
than their attitudes toward disliked groups or their fear of negative consequences of 
tolerance (Marcus et al, 1995; Sullivan et al, 1982). Further, political elite status and 
political expertise are often seen and analyzed as similar constructs in the political 
tolerance literature (as elites are more likely to be experts and vice-versa; Zaller, 1990; 
Krosnick, 1990; Golebiowska, 1999), and it stand to reason that both high political status 
and high political knowledge bring with them a strong commitment to the values of the 
political system. 
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Expertise, Democratic Values, and Tolerance 
 Political expertise and support for democratic values are among the two most 
significant and frequently-replicated predictors of political tolerance. In addition, these 
two constructs’ respective influences on tolerance have often been hypothesized to be 
related in some way (typically using language suggestive of mediation), though this 
relationship has never been tested. Sullivan and Transue (1999) state the 
fundamentality of these two predictors well:  “In general, political experts exhibit higher 
levels of applied tolerance than do political novices, and in all cases, strong beliefs in 
democratic values constrain citizens to be more tolerant in practical situations.” (p.635). 
Political experts are hypothesized to have greater knowledge of (and support for) the 
political “rules of the game” than nonexperts, who are by definition less familiar with 
democratic laws and concepts such as procedural fairness; Thus, political experts may 
be more tolerant than novices because they have greater support for democratic values 
(Jones, 1979; Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al, 1979). In addition, however, political experts 
may be more likely to enter democratic values into consideration when forming a 
tolerance judgment, in part because of their greater knowledge and familiarity of 
political issues—in which case, the relationship between expertise and tolerance may be 
accounted for by the increased accessibility of democratic norms amongst experts 
(Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Price & Ottati, 2012).  Further, experts may have more 
rehearsed, ‘automatic’ (or implicit) support for democratic norms than novices, again 
due to knowing and thinking a great deal more about politics than novices, and experts’ 
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implicit attitude of democratic values support may explain their high tolerance (for a 
related argument see Price & Ottati, 2012). Finally, political experts may assign more 
importance to democratic values, relative to novices (who may assign greater 
importance to other factors, such as their attitude toward the target group), and thus 
are more tolerant as a result. The exact mechanism by which tolerance, political 
expertise, and support for democratic values are related is unclear at this point. Since 
expertise and democratic values are two of the central predictors of tolerance, and 
since their relationship has been hypothesized but not tested to date, these possible 
mediational pathways are overdue for study.  
Possible Mechanisms for the Relationship Between Expertise and Tolerance 
 The relationship between expertise and tolerance has been frequently noted, 
but theoretical explanations for the relationship have been presented without being 
subject to any empirical testing. Many of the underlying proposed mechanisms for the 
link between expertise and political tolerance involves the influence of democratic 
values support, though these proposed relationships have also been left unexplored.  
The possibility that democratic norm support mediates the relationship between 
expertise and tolerance is especially in need of testing, as it has been proposed 
theoretically by numerous researchers but left unexplored (Marcus et al, 1995; 
Sniderman, 1975; Golebiowska, 1999) and since it is clear that democratic norm support 
and expertise are in fact correlated (Golebiowska, 1999). 
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However, support for a set of values could mediate the relationship between 
expertise and tolerance by several methods: for example, explicit value support might 
not be as strong a predictor of tolerance (or as strong a mediator of the relationship 
between expertise and tolerance) as implicit support for democratic values. 
Alternatively, support for democratic values itself might not by the true key predictor of 
tolerance; it may be more important to examine whether or not a respondent actually 
considers democratic values at all when forming a tolerance judgment (in which case 
the accessibility of democratic values may be the mediator, not support). Finally, the 
relationship between expertise and tolerance might be mediated instead by the 
importance individuals place on democratic values. This paper will examine several 
possible mechanisms for the relationship between expertise and tolerance, all involving 
mediation by constructs related to democratic values.  
 Support for democratic values. First, the relationship between expertise and 
tolerance may be mediated by explicit support for democratic norms and values.  In 
other words, experts simply support the procedural “rules of the game” at a greater rate 
than non-experts, and are more tolerant as a result. This relationship was intimated by 
many tolerance researchers (Stouffer, 1955; Sullivan et al, 1982), but was first explicitly 
stated as a mediational relationship by Sniderman (1975), who proposed that political 
experts were more supportive of the norms and values of the democratic system, by 
virtue of their greater knowledge and greater attachment to the realm of politics, and 
that this was responsible for their greater willingness to allot free speech rights to 
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groups they found despicable. Golebiowska (1999) found some preliminary support for 
this, though she did not test the mediation effect directly: female respondents were 
found to be less tolerant as a result of lower commitment to democratic norms and 
lower political expertise, and the possibility that the latter mediated the relationship of 
the former was presented but was not within the scope of her research.  It is high time, 
then, for research to directly examine whether explicit endorsement of democratic 
values mediates the link between expertise and tolerance.  
 Accessibility of democratic values. A great deal of research suggests that 
forming a tolerance judgment is usually a relatively automatic process, similar perhaps 
to bias correction (e.g. Devine, 1989), that occurs without much conscious cognitive 
appraisal of competing tradeoffs and considerations (e.g. Kuklinski et al, 1991, 1993; 
Price & Ottati, 2012).  While it may be normatively ideal for a voter to consider many 
factors when forming a tolerance judgment (such as the consequences of the speech, 
democratic norms, attitudes toward the target group, and the consequences of speech 
repression, to name a few), most people instead form swift, knee-jerk decisions that are 
limited in scope and are susceptible to framing and priming effects (Nelson et al, 1997; 
Shamir & Sullivan, 1983). Indeed, political tolerance research involving both framing 
(Nelson et al, 1997) and motivation (Kuklinski et al, 1991; 1993; Price & Ottati, 2012) 
indicates that tolerance judgments are quite malleable on the basis of which factors 
respondents are pressed to consider (and which to overlook).  This suggests that the key 
mediator between expertise and tolerance may not be individuals’ support for 
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democratic norms, but rather how readily accessible democratic norms are to 
individuals in general. Thus, mere support for democratic norms may not be the most 
useful variable to examine as a mediator of the link between expertise and tolerance; 
after all, there is a great deal of ‘slippage’ from abstract support for civil liberties and 
specific tolerance judgments. Instead, experts may be more tolerant than political 
novices because democratic norms are more accessible when they are forming their 
appraisals of tolerance. In such case, democratic value accessibility would be expected 
to mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance rather than mere 
endorsement of democratic values, as tacit support for democratic values is quite 
distinct from actually taking that support into consideration when forming a judgment 
 Implicit support for democratic norms. Some evidence suggests that while 
explicit support for democratic values may predict tolerance, implicit support of 
democratic values may explain variance in tolerance more effectively. Experts appear to 
be tolerant ‘automatically’, as their responses remain tolerant even when asked to 
respond to questions while distracted (Price & Ottati, 2012), suggesting that the 
influence democratic values has on expert tolerance may not be conscious or 
deliberative; Relatedly, high tolerance appears to occur as a relatively automatic ‘knee-
jerk’, rather than as the result of slow, effortful conscious processing (Kuklinski et al, 
1991, 1992). This all implies that while explicit support of democratic values may predict 
tolerance, implicit democratic values attitudes may explain variance in tolerance more 
effectively, and may better mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance. 
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Many individuals who explicitly support democratic values may throw their values out 
the window when responding to specific tolerance questions involving a reviled target 
group, or when reminded of competing considerations (such as safety or public 
outrage). This may dilute the ability of explicit democratic values support to predict 
tolerance. The very presence of ‘slippage’ from abstract tolerance to specific 
(in)tolerance is itself a reflection of the fact that explicit support for democratic values 
does not always lead to a tolerant response (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Stouffer, 1955; 
Peffley & Rohrsnieder, 2003).  Further, explicit-reported support for democratic values 
may be an imperfect reflection of democratic values support,  especially considering 
that most participants are aware of the ‘correct’, socially desirable response to such 
questions (e.g. Ganster et al, 1993).  The present set of studies will be the first to 
examine whether political experts have a greater internalized support for democratic 
values, and will test whether this implicit attitude mediates the expertise-tolerance link.  
 Greater importance of democratic norms. Finally, experts may be more tolerant 
than novices simply because they place greater importance on democratic values when 
assessing tolerance scenarios. Attitude importance is crucial in determining whether an 
attitude will influence actual behavior, and also helps predict whether an attitude will 
be susceptible to attempts at persuasion or will influence other attitudes toward related 
objects (Krosnick, 1988; Boninger et al, 1995). As has already been mentioned, tolerance 
often involves tradeoffs between numerous values and factors, not all of which are 
consciously considered by the typical respondent (Kuklinski et al, 1991; 1993). Hence, 
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general democratic values support may be less useful as a predictor of tolerance than an 
individuals’ explicit rating of the importance of democratic values. If an individual 
considers democratic freedoms and norms to be paramount, they are likely to consider 
such values when forming a tolerance judgment, and if they feel democratic values are 
relatively unimportant they are likely to ignore them, regardless of their level of explicit 
endorsement.  Political experts typically place a great deal of interest and importance 
on political issues, however, and are probably more likely to consider democratic values 
relevant (and important) when coming to a decision about tolerance scenarios 
(Krosnick, 1988). Therefore the present studies will also examine whether individuals’ 
perceived importance of democratic values mediates the link between expertise and 
tolerance.  
 Possible interactions/ moderated mediational pathways. In addition, the 
relationship between expertise and tolerance may be mediated by an interaction 
between two of the constructs listed above (i.e., a mediational path outlined above may 
be moderated by another predictor). Three such possible relationships are explored 
below. 
 Explicit support and importance of democratic values. The effect of expertise on 
tolerance might be moderated by the interaction between explicit support for 
democratic norms and participants’ perceived importance of democratic norms. That is, 
the positive link between expertise and tolerance may only be present among 
individuals who both support democratic values and consider such values important and 
31 
 
 
 
worthy of consideration and “weight” when forming tolerance judgments (e.g. Miller & 
Krosnick, 2000). Thus, the interaction between support and importance should be 
examined as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship. 
 Explicit support and accessibility of democratic values. Similarly, explicit support 
for democratic values might only influence tolerance when such support is readily 
accessible (see, for example, work by Iyengar et al, 1982; and Behr & Iyengar, 1985, 
suggesting that for an issue to influence public opinion, it must be made accessible 
through media “agenda setting’ or some other form of priming that calls the issue to 
mind; and work by Srull & Wyer, 1979, suggesting that for information to influence a 
judgment, that information must be readily accessible or made accessible). In this case, 
the accessibility of democratic values determines whether or not support for democratic 
values is granted “weight” in tolerance judgments. This effect of accessibility may 
moderate any mediational path between expertise, support for democratic norms, and 
tolerance. Accordingly, the possible interaction between explicit support for democratic 
norms and democratic norms accessibility should be examined as a further mediator of 
the relationship between expertise and tolerance.  
 Accessibility and implicit support for democratic values. It is a further possibility 
that the interaction between accessibility of democratic values and implicit support for 
democratic values might better explain the relationship between expertise and 
tolerance. Implicit support for democratic values may be a more ‘pure’ measure of 
participants’ attitudes toward democratic norms, as discussed above; In addition, the 
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influence of implicit support of democratic norms on tolerance may be moderated by 
how readily accessible democratic values are to participants. Accordingly, the 
interaction between accessibility and implicit support should be examined as a mediator 
of the expertise-tolerance relationship. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PRESENT STUDIES 
Overview 
While democratic values have long been theorized to be a mediator of the 
relationship between expertise and tolerance (Sniderman, 1975), this body of research 
presents the first direct empirical tests of this relationship. Three studies will examine 
the possible mediational pathways between expertise, democratic values, and tolerance 
specified above. In each of the three studies, political expertise and tolerance will be 
assessed; however in each study at least two distinct constructs related to democratic 
values will be measured and assessed as mediators of the expertise-tolerance 
relationship, as well as a possible interaction between the two proposed mediators (see 
below for details). The three studies will examine these potential mediational 
relationships rather than one large study containing all possible mediators, because with 
the inclusion of each additional measure it becomes increasingly difficult to order 
questions in such a manner that one measure does not influence another (particularly 
implicit measures which might inadvertently prime democratic values or be influenced 
by explicit measures; see Schwarz, Strack, & Mai 1991; and Schwarz & Hippler, 1995 for 
a discussion of contrast and assimilation effects resulting from question order).  
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Study One 
Study one will measure political expertise, explicit support for democratic values, 
importance of democratic norms and political tolerance, to determine whether the 
relationship between expertise and tolerance is, in fact, mediated by democratic values, 
importance, or the interaction between the two (see Chapter Five for additional details). 
Several hypotheses pertaining to these variables will be examined in this study. Direct 
effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic values importance, and explicit 
support for democratic values are anticipated in this study. Additionally, explicit support 
is expected to significantly predict political tolerance, and democratic values importance 
is expected to significantly predict political tolerance.  In terms of simple (i.e. 
nonmoderated) mediational effects, it is expected that the effect of expertise on 
tolerance will be diminished when the effect of explicit democratic values on tolerance 
is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by 
democratic values importance will be examined (see Chapter Five for full list of 
hypotheses in study one).  
In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational 
pathways will be tested in this study. One moderated mediational model will test 
whether the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by explicit democratic values 
support, and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by importance of 
democratic values. Note, here, that importance of democratic values could conceivably 
moderate two possible relationships in this model: it might moderate the path from 
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expertise (the IV) to explicit support (the mediator), it might moderate the path from 
explicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or it might moderate both (see 
Appendix A for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities will be 
examined in this study.  
Another moderated mediational model will be examined in this study, testing 
whether importance of democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertise-
tolerance relationship, and whether such mediational pathway is moderated by explicit 
democratic values support. Again, explicit democratic values support could moderate 
the mediational pathway in multiple ways: first, it might moderate the relationship 
between expertise (the IV) and importance (the mediator), it might moderate the path 
from importance (the mediator) to political tolerance (the DV), or it might moderate 
both. All three possibilities will be examined in this study as well.  
Study Two 
Study two will measure expertise, explicit democratic values support, and 
political tolerance using the same methods as study one, but will first examine 
participants’ democratic value accessibility  to determine whether the link between 
expertise and tolerance is mediated by how inclined participants are to consider 
democratic values without prompting (see Chapter Six for details). Because the novel 
construct of interest in this study is how readily participants think of democratic values 
without external prompting, the measurement of accessibility will be implicit. In 
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addition, the interaction between explicit support for democratic values and the 
accessibility of democratic values will also be examined as a mediator.  
Direct effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic value accessibility, 
and explicit support for democratic values are anticipated. In addition, explicit support is 
expected to significantly predict political tolerance and democratic value accessibility as 
well. Democratic value accessibility is expected to also significantly predict political 
tolerance.  In terms of simple (i.e. nonmoderated) mediational effects, it is expected 
that the effect of expertise on tolerance will be diminished when the effect of explicit 
democratic values on tolerance is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of the 
expertise-tolerance effect by democratic value accessibility will be examined (see 
Chapter Six for full list of hypotheses in study two).  
In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational 
pathways will be tested in this study. One moderated mediational model that will be 
examined will test whether the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by explicit 
democratic values support, and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by 
accessibility of democratic values. Note, here, that accessibility of democratic values 
could conceivably moderate two possible relationships in this model: it might moderate 
the path from expertise (the IV) to explicit support (the mediator), it might moderate 
the path from explicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or it might moderate 
both (see Appendix A for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities 
will be examined in this study.  
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Another moderated mediational model will examine whether accessibility of 
democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, and 
whether this mediational pathway is moderated by explicit democratic values support. 
Again, explicit democratic values support could moderate the mediational pathway in 
multiple ways: first, it might moderate the relationship between expertise (the IV) and 
accessibility (the mediator), it might moderate the path from accessibility (the mediator) 
to political tolerance (the DV), or it might moderate both. All three possibilities will be 
examined in this study as well.  
Study Three 
Study three will measure expertise and political tolerance in the same fashion as 
studies one and two, and will measure democratic value accessibility in the same 
fashion as study two, but will additionally examine participants’ implicit support for 
democratic norms by measuring the degree to which they implicitly associate 
democratic values with positive targets.  
In this study, direct effects of expertise on political tolerance, democratic value 
accessibility, and implicit support for democratic values are anticipated; additionally, 
implicit support is expected to significantly predict political tolerance and democratic 
value accessibility as well. Democratic value accessibility is expected to also significantly 
predict political tolerance.  In terms of simple (i.e. nonmoderated) mediational effects, it 
is expected that the effect of expertise on tolerance will be diminished when the effect 
of implicit democratic values on tolerance is taken into account. Similarly, mediation of 
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the expertise-tolerance effect by democratic value accessibility will be examined (see 
Chapter Six for full list of hypotheses in study two).  
In addition to these simple mediational models, several moderated mediational 
pathways will be tested. One moderated mediational model that will examine whether 
the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated by implicit democratic values support, 
and whether this mediational pathway is moderated by the accessibility of democratic 
values. Note, here, that accessibility of democratic values could moderate the path from 
expertise (the IV) to implicit support (the mediator). Alternatively, it might moderate the 
path from implicit support (the mediator) to political tolerance, or both (see Appendix A 
for a discussion of the statistical difference). All these possibilities will be examined in 
this study.  
Another moderated mediational model will be examined in this study, testing 
whether accessibility of democratic values serves as a mediator of the expertise-
tolerance relationship, and whether such mediational pathway is moderated by implicit 
democratic values support. Again, implicit democratic values support could moderate 
the mediational pathway in multiple ways: first, it might moderate the path from 
expertise (the IV) and accessibility (the mediator), the path from accessibility (the 
mediator) to political tolerance (the DV), or both. All three possibilities will be examined 
in this study as well.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
GENERAL METHODS 
Overview 
 In each of the three present studies, political expertise, political tolerance, 
participant demographics (such as age, education, and gender) and control variables 
(such as political ideology and party) were measured using the same survey items. Each 
study also included the measurement of at least two of the four potential mediators of 
the expertise-tolerance relationship: explicit support for democratic values, accessibility 
of democratic values, implicit support for democratic values, and importance of 
democratic values, respectively.  Below is a general overview of the participants utilized, 
the measured predictor variables, the measured control variables and demographics, 
and the measured dependent variables that are common across all studies. Deviations 
from this are noted below (under each individual study’s heading).  
Participants  
Participants were drawn from a convenience sample of United States citizens of 
legal voting age recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk). Participants were 
recruited to participate in a study on their “political attitudes” that was advertised as 
lasting less than thirty minutes in duration, and for which they received payment of USD 
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$0.50. Participation was limited to English-fluent US citizens with internet protocol 
addresses (IP addresses) that identify them as currently residing in the US; these 
restrictions will be imposed using Mechanical Turk’s enrollment rules. Upon enrolling in 
the study via mTurk, participants’ responses were collected using the 
web-based survey software SNAP (for general survey questions) and WINTERAMIAT (for 
IAT results in study three; Allon, 2013). 
Materials: Predictor Variables 
 Political expertise. Participants’ political expertise was measured using Delli-
Carpini and Keeter’s (1993) recommended short form measure of political expertise. 
Expertise was assessed after tolerance and the proposed mediator for each study, as it 
was unlikely that the measurement of either construct would influence how much a 
participant knows about politics, whereas answering a potentially challenging political 
knowledge questionnaire could influence participants’ responses to questions 
pertaining to tolerance and democratic values (for example, by leading participants who 
perform poorly on the expertise measure to be less certain of their views).Participants 
were asked, in an open-ended format, to identify the political party currently controlling 
the House of Representatives at the time of data collection, to name the branch of 
government responsible for determining the constitutionality of a law, who the current 
Vice President is, which party is most conservative, and what congressional majority is 
needed to override a Presidential veto. In addition, participants were provided with ten 
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multiple-choice questions, each asking for the identification of a political figure in terms 
of their current role (e.g., participants would be provided with the name Nancy Pelosi 
and were asked to select her current political office held from five possible multiple-
choice options). These ten items were scored as either correct or incorrect, and then 
totaled into a single political expertise score.  
Materials: Dependent variables 
 In all three studies, participants’ political tolerance was recorded using Sullivan, 
Piereson, and Marcus’ (1982) content-controlled measure of tolerance.  
Sullivan, Pierson & Marcus (1982). For the Sullivan et al measure of tolerance, 
participants were asked to select their least-liked group in politics from a list provided 
by the experimenter. Possible groups included the Ku Klux Klan, Pro-Abortionists, Anti-
Abortionists, Occupy Wall Street Protestors, Tea Party Members, Fascists, Communists, 
Islamic Fundamentalists, and Atheists (note: some of the groups listed are from Sullivan 
et al’s original measure, whereas others are more current political groups added by the 
experimenter). Participants also had the option of naming a group not provided by the 
experimenter. After selecting a “least-liked” group, participants were provided with a 
series of statements pertaining to the civil liberties of their target group (e.g. “Members 
of the ____  should be banned from being president of  the United  States.”; Members 
of  the ____  should  be allowed  to teach in the public schools.”) and were asked to 
provide their agreement or disagreement with each statement on a 1-7 scale (ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). Responses to each of the scale items were 
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normalized and averaged to calculate a participants’ least-liked procedure tolerance 
score.  
Materials: Control Measures 
 Participants were asked to report their political ideology on a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal) with a midpoint of 
"moderate”. Participants were also asked to report their party identification on an 
ordinal scale with the following options: Strong Democrat, Moderate Democrat, 
Independent, Moderate Republican, and Strong Democrat.  Participants were asked 
about their attitude toward their selected least-liked group, using a seven-point scale 
ranging from “Strongly Dislike” to “Strongly Like”. Participants were asked to report 
their age, gender, highest level of education, and region of the country, each being 
assessed by a single question with multiple-choice responses. Participants were asked to 
report their past political participation by selecting political activities they have 
performed in the past from a checklist, (“Have you engaged in any of the following 
political activities? Please check all that apply.”); the checklist included donating to 
political campaigns, volunteering for past political campaigns, voting in Presidential 
elections, voting in non-Presidential elections, wearing political buttons, displaying 
political bumper stickers or yard signs, and donating to political candidates. All control 
measures will be collected at the end of each respective study. 
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Procedure 
 Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (with the 
exception of study three; see below). On mTurk, the studies were advertised as surveys 
on “Americans’ Political Opinions” and study had an advertised length of less than thirty 
minutes, with a pay of $0.50. Upon agreeing to participate and “accepting” the study 
advertisement on mTurk, participants were directed to a survey link on SNAP. The 
survey on SNAP informed participants of their rights and obtain anonymous consent. 
Following informed consent, participants were assessed for the democratic value 
accessibility  (in studies 2 and 3), then directed to a page that asked for their least-liked 
group in politics; participants’ least-liked group were fed into the stems of the Sullivan 
et al (1982) tolerance questions, which participants then answered. Following these 
questions, participants were asked about their explicit support for democratic values (in 
studies 1 and 2), their implicit support for democratic values (in study three), and their 
subjective importance of democratic values (in study one) (see below for greater detail 
on measures and question order for each specific study).   Participants then reported 
their political expertise. Following these key variables, participants were asked to report 
their political ideology, political party, and their demographics. Upon completing the 
survey participants were debriefed and assigned payment via mTurk.   
Proposed Statistical Treatment 
 Multiple regression was used to analyze the data from the present studies.  
Continuous predictor variables (e.g., political expertise, explicit democratic values 
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support, etc) were centered (by subtracting participant's scores on each scale from the 
sample mean). These predictors were then entered into a regression equation.  For each 
study, hypothesized main effects of predictors on tolerance were interpreted by 
examining effects for that predictor. To test mediation, Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four-
step procedure was used (see the following Chapters for study-specific hypotheses and 
details). To test moderated mediation when at least one predictor is not correlated with 
expertise, Muller et al’s (2005) procedure was used, employing Preacher et al’s (2007) 
MODMED macro (see Appendix B for details). To test moderated mediation in cases 
where both predictor variables (mediator and moderator) were correlated with 
expertise, Preacher et al’s (2007) was also used, employing a slightly distinct model in 
MODMED (see below for details). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 
Reliability Analyses 
Composite scores were created for all multi-item measures, including political 
tolerance, political expertise, explicit support for democratic values, importance of 
democratic values, implicit support for democratic values, and accessibility of 
democratic values. Reliability analyses were performed to determine how best to create 
these composite scores. All twenty tolerance items were highly internally reliable upon 
initial analysis (α=.771 for study one, α=.945 for study two, α=.946 for study three), and 
so all twenty items were included in participants’ composite political tolerance score 
across all three studies. Political expertise was highly internally reliable across all studies 
(α=.751 for Study one, α=.780 for study two, α=.768 for study three) and all items were 
therefore retained for participants’ composite score. Democratic values importance was 
highly internally reliable across both studies in which it was recorded (α=.913 for study 
one, α=.751 for study two). Explicit support for democratic values was highly reliable 
across both studies in which it was recorded (α=.777 in study one, α=.743 for study 
two). Accessibility of democratic values was reliable across both studies in which it was 
recorded (α=.860 in study two, α=.659 in study three). Implicit support of democratic 
values was highly reliable in the study in which it was recorded (α=.707 in study three). 
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Due to this consistent high reliability, all composite scales were kept intact across all 
three studies and analyzed accordingly. 
Bivariate Relations Between Variables 
 Due to the considerable overlap in variables analyzed in study one, two, and 
three, it was considered prudent to first examine the bivariate relations between 
variables in all three studies before selecting appropriate control variables to be used 
across studies. This allowed for the selection of control variables to be consistent across 
all three studies and all three sets of analyses. Accordingly, the bivariate relationships 
between variables in all three studies will be described below, and possible control 
variables will be discussed before the results of the individual studies are explored.  
Study One 
 Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the 
various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic 
values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables, 
such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 1). Political 
expertise was significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic values support 
(r=.270, r²=.07, p<.001), positively correlated with political participation (r=.344, r²=.118, 
p<.001), positively correlated with education (r=.401, r²=.16, p<.001), and positively 
correlated with age (r=.358, r²=.13, p<.001. Explicit support for democratic values was 
significantly positively correlated with political participation (r=.156, r²=.02, p<.013), and 
education(r=.216, r²=.05, p<.001).  Importance of democratic values was significantly 
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positively correlated with age (r= .131, r²=.02, p<.041). Education was significantly 
positively correlated with participation (r=.180, r²=.03, p<.040). Not surprisingly, political 
ideology and political party were strongly positively correlated (r=.794, r²=.63, p<.001), 
such that more conservative ideologies were associated with a more Republican party 
identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic party identification). 
Political ideology was also positively correlated with age (r=.133, r²=.02, p<.035), with 
more conservative ideological placement being associated with greater age. Correlation 
results therefore confirm that explicit support, importance, and expertise are correlated 
but conceptually distinct constructs. 
 The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were 
also examined (see Table 1). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated 
with political expertise (r=.167, r²=.03, p<.009). Tolerance was also strongly positively 
correlated with explicit democratic values support (r=.216, r²=.05, p<.001), political 
participation (r=.344, r²=.12, p<.001), and education (r=.401, r²=.16, p<.001). Note that 
political ideology and political party, despite being variables of massive import in 
political psychology, were only correlated with one another (r=.794, r²=.63 p<.001) and 
not with political tolerance. This is typical for the political tolerance literature, and is 
consistent with past research using the least-liked measurement procedure, 
demonstrating no direct link between political ideology and political tolerance (Sullivan 
et al, 1981). Note also that political tolerance was not correlated with importance of 
democratic values in this study(r=.046, r²=.002, p=.484). 
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Study Two 
 Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the 
various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic 
values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables, 
such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 2). Political 
expertise was significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic values support 
(r= .291, r²= .08, p<.001), positively correlated with democratic value accessibility  (r= 
.292, r²= .09, p<.001) positively correlated with political participation (r=.383, r²=.146, 
p<.001), positively correlated with education (r= .366, r²=.134, p<.001), and positively 
correlated with age (r= .246, r²=.06, p<.001. Explicit support for democratic values was 
significantly positively correlated with democratic value accessibility (r= .170, r²=.03, 
p<.007), positively correlated with participation (r=.193, r²=.04, p<.002), negatively 
correlated with political party (r=-.163, r²=.04, p<.009), and negatively correlated with 
political ideology (r= -.204, r²=.04, p<.001).  Education was significantly positively 
correlated with participation (r= .325, r²=.11, p<.001) and age (r= .217, r²=.05, p<.001). 
Not surprisingly, political ideology and political party were strongly positively correlated 
(r= .751, r²=.56, p<.001), such that more conservative ideologies were associated with a 
more Republican party identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic 
party identification). Political ideology was also positively correlated with age (r= .148, 
r²=.01, p<.018), with more conservative ideological placement being associated with 
greater age, and with participation (r= -.132, r²=.02, p<.036), with less participation 
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being associated with a more conservative ideology. Correlation results thus have 
confirmed that explicit support, accessibility, and expertise are correlated but 
conceptually distinct constructs. 
 The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were 
also examined (see Table 2). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated 
with political expertise (r= .372, r²=.14, p<.001). Tolerance was also strongly positively 
correlated with explicit democratic values support (r= .618, r²=.38, p<.001), democratic 
value accessibility (r= .137, r²= .02, p<.029), education (r= .249, r²= .06, p<.001), and 
participation (r= .252, r²= .06, p<.001). Note that political ideology and political party, 
despite being variables of massive import in political psychology, were only correlated 
with one another (r=.751, r²=.56 p<.001) and not with political tolerance. This is 
consistent with past research demonstrating no direct link between political ideology 
and political tolerance (Sullivan et al, 1981), as well as with the results of study one.  
Study Three 
 Preliminary analyses were performed to examine the relation between the 
various continuous predictor variables- political expertise, explicit support of democratic 
values, and importance of democratic values (as well as the potential control variables, 
such as political ideology, political party, education, and age; see Table 3). Political 
expertise was significantly positively correlated with implicit democratic values support 
(r= .305, r²= .09, p<.001), positively correlated with political participation (r=.440, 
r²=.194, p<.001), positively correlated with education (r= .268, r²=.072, p<.001), and 
positively correlated with age (r= .365, r²=.133, p<.001), and was negatively correlated 
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with attitude toward least liked group (r=-.247, r²=.061, p<.001) . Implicit support for 
democratic values was significantly positively correlated with age (r= .244, r²=.059, 
p<.001), positively correlated with participation (r=.250, r²=.063, p<.001), negatively 
correlated with political ideology (r=-.144, r²=.02, p<.022, indicating that conservatism 
was associated with lower implicit support), and negatively correlated with attitude 
toward least liked group (r=-.184, r²=033, p<.01).  Democratic value accessibility was 
significantly positively correlated with ideology (r= .151, r²=.022, p<.017; conservatism 
was associated with greater democratic value accessibility). Education was positively 
correlated with participation (r= .323, r²=.104, p<.001), age (r= .172, r²=.029, p<.006) 
and negatively correlated with attitude toward least liked group (r=-.129, r²=.016, p<.04) 
and political party (r= -.132, r²=.017, p<.037; Republican identification was associated 
with lower education). Participation was also negatively correlated with attitude toward 
least liked group (r=-.249, r²=.062, p<.001). Not surprisingly, political ideology and 
political party were strongly positively correlated (r= .774, r²=.599, p<.001), such that 
more conservative ideologies were associated with a more Republican Party 
identification (and likewise for liberal ideology and Democratic Party identification). 
Political party was also negatively correlated with participation (r= -.132, r²=.017, 
p<.037), with less participation being associated with a more conservative ideology. 
Correlation results therefore confirm that accessibility, implicit support, and expertise 
are correlated but conceptually distinct constructs. 
 The bivariate relations between predictor variables and political tolerance were 
also examined (see Table 3). Political tolerance was significantly positively correlated 
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with political expertise (r= .261, r²=.068, p<.001). Tolerance was also positively 
correlated with implicit democratic values support (r= .138, r²=.019, p<.029), democratic 
value accessibility (r= .135, r²= .018, p<.032), education (r= .170, r²= .028, p<.007), and 
participation (r= .287, r²= .082, p<.001). Political ideology was significantly negatively 
correlated with tolerance in this study (r= -.182, r²=.033, p<.004), in sharp contrast with 
the prior two studies and with most prior research on political tolerance.  
Potential Control Variables 
 In light of these preliminary results, three variables emerged as potential 
controls, due to their significant correlations with political tolerance in at least one of 
three studies: Education, Political Participation, and Ideology. For various reasons, these 
variables are not always appropriate controls for inclusion in all analyses across all 
studies: ideology is only correlated with tolerance in one study (study three), and is 
therefore not appropriate as a control variable in studies one and two. As for education 
and participation, which are correlated with political tolerance, these constructs are also 
possible antecedents to political expertise, and therefore controlling for these variables 
might, in essence, control for the effect of one of the key variables in this study. 
However, it should be noted in advance that all analyses in these studies were, 
nonetheless, run both with and without controls, and inclusion of education, 
participation, age, and ideology made no difference in the results of any analysis (see 
appendix C for analyses with controls). The rationale for excluding these variables from 
the main analyses, however, follows.  
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Education 
  Education was found to be a significant correlate of tolerance in all three studies 
(see Tables 1, 2, and 3). Education was also, however, a strong positive correlate of 
political expertise. This is consistent with extant political tolerance research and theory, 
which holds that education, particularly civics education, is a large contributor to both 
political knowledge and political tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; 
Jackman, 1972; Nunn et al, 1978; Bobo & Licari, 1989; see Chapter One of this 
dissertation). It is therefore unwise, when political expertise is the key predictor of 
interest, to control for effects of an antecedent to political expertise. Future research 
should examine the relationship between education, civics education, political 
knowledge, and tolerance, but since such questions are outside the purview of the 
present dissertation, it will not be discussed at length in this text (see Discussion 
Chapter of this dissertation). Education was therefore not used as a control variable in 
main analyses. However, all analyses were replicated with education included as a 
control, and there was no significant difference in any of the results (see Appendix C).  
Participation 
 Participation was found to be a significant correlate of tolerance in all three 
studies. However, the pitfalls of controlling for the effects of participation are similar to 
the pitfalls of controlling for education; namely, it has long been theorized that taking 
part in politics makes a person more informed about the political landscape, and more 
familiar with (and tolerant of) opposing views as a result (McClosky, 1964; McClosky & 
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Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nunn et al, 1978; Stouffer, 1955; see Chapter One 
of this dissertation). Participation, is of course, also strongly correlated with political 
expertise in these studies and in much of the political tolerance literature. Accordingly, 
it was decided that political participation should not be included as a control variable in 
the main analyses. Nonetheless, all analyses were replicated with participation included 
as a control, as was the case with education, and it had no impact on the pattern or 
significance of results (see Appendix C for analyses with controls).  
Ideology 
 In study three, participants’ political ideology was found to be correlated with 
political tolerance, such that more liberal attitudes were associated with greater 
tolerance. This was inconsistent with the other two studies, which indicated there was 
no relationship between political tolerance and ideology. This result is also in sharp 
contrast with the prevailing findings in the political tolerance literature, particularly 
ones employing the least-liked measurement method; political ideology and party are 
typically found to be unrelated to political tolerance when respondents are allowed to 
select their own target group (see, e.g. Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Jackman, 1972; Sullivan 
et al, 1982; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983; Price & Ottati, 2012). Due to the fact that ideology 
is not typically related to tolerance, and due to the fact that it was not correlated with 
tolerance in the majority of these three studies, ideology was generally not explored as 
a control variable in the main analyses. Ideology was, however, included as a control 
when replicating analyses in study three, and had no impact on the pattern or 
significance of results (see Appendix C). 
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                                                      CHAPTER FIVE 
                                                        STUDY ONE 
Overview 
 In this first study, political tolerance was measured as the chief dependent 
variable of interest, and political expertise, explicit democratic values support, and 
democratic values importance were assessed as predictors. In addition, potential 
control variables such as education, participation, political ideology, and political party 
were assessed (see Chapter Four for details). This study was primarily concerned with 
examining effects of expertise, explicit democratic values, and democratic values 
importance on tolerance, respectively, as well as examining effects of expertise on 
importance and explicit support (see Hypotheses below). Additionally, mediation of the 
expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit support and importance, respectively, were 
examined. Moderated forms of these two mediational pathways were also tested (see 
below for specific hypotheses).  
Hypotheses 
H1: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a 
strong positive predictor of tolerance. 
H2: In direct replication of numerous studies, support for democratic values will 
predict tolerance. 
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H3: Expertise will predict explicit support for democratic values.  
H4: Expertise will predict importance of democratic values. 
H5: Importance of democratic values will predict tolerance. 
H6: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
support for democratic values.  
H7: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
importance of democratic values.  
H8: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
importance of democratic values, when controlling for explicit support.  
H9: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
support for democratic values, when controlling for importance.  
H10: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for 
democratic values for high importance participants. However, the effect of expertise on 
tolerance is not mediated by democratic values for low importance participants. This 
hypothesis presumes that importance of democratic values and expertise are not 
correlated, as per Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see 
Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail). 
H11: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by importance for high 
support explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is 
not mediated by importance for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis 
presumes that support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per 
Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation. 
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H12: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by importance for high 
explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not 
mediated by importance for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes 
that support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and importance and 
expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested 
(Preacher et al, 2007). 
H13: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for high 
importance participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated 
by explicit support for low importance participants. This hypothesis presumes that 
support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and importance and 
expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested that 
the related hypothesis, above (Preacher et al, 2007). 
Methods 
Proposed Mediators: Explicit Support for Democratic Values and Importance of 
Democratic Values 
 In study one, participants’ explicit support for democratic norms was assessed 
(using multiple measures from both Sullivan et al, 1995 and the World Values Survey) as 
a predictor of political tolerance, as well as importance of democratic values. Explicit 
support for democratic norms and importance were measured after political tolerance, 
as inquiring about participants’ support for democratic norms prior to the tolerance 
questionnaire might increase the salience of such values and could influence tolerance 
judgments as a result (note, however, that related research has used either question 
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order with no apparent effect; Stouffer, 1955; Sniderman, 1975; Peffley et al, 2001.)  
Out of necessity, and in accordance with most studies of attitude importance, the 
importance of democratic values was recorded after explicit support (Krosnick, 1988).  
Support for democratic norms. Participants’ explicit support for democratic 
norms was recorded using Sullivan et al’s (1985) Support for the Norms of Democracy 
Scale. This scale has been used to study support for democratic values in both the 
United States and developing former member states of the Soviet Union (Gibson et al, 
1992) and has been consistently validated as a measure of participants’ attitudes 
toward democratic ideals. The scale consists of four statements regarding the normative 
value of equal protection under the law (e.g. “No matter what a person’s political beliefs 
are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.”), two of 
which are reverse-scored (e.g. “When the country is in great danger we may have to 
force people to testify against themselves even if this violates their civil rights. “). In the 
present study, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with these 
statements by selecting values on a 1-7 scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree” (note: some early versions of this survey only provided three response 
options: agree, disagree, and don’t know, but for the sake of increasing variation in 
responses the present study will use a 1-7 scale).  
Democratic values importance. Following each item in the democratic values 
support scales, participants were asked how important their attitude is to them (“For 
the above question, how important is this attitude to you?”), selecting an option from a 
1 to 7 scale (ranging from “not at all important” to “very important”; (Krosnick, 1988). 
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Results 
Participant Demographics 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (M=32.60, SD=11.535). Most 
participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (M=4.24, 
SD=1.688). Fifty-eight percent of participants were male (N=146) and forty-one percent 
were female (N=105). All participants were American citizens (N=251) and ninety-four 
percent of participants reported English as their first language (N=237). Participants 
were moderate in their level of political participation (M=2.41, SD=1.455). The most 
least-liked groups most frequently chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan 
(48.8%), Islamic Fundamentalists (14.2%), Tea Party Protesters (7.4%), Fascists (7.6%), 
Communists (4.8%), Anti-Abortionists (5.6%), and Pro-Abortionists (2.4%).  
Study One Main Analyses 
 Three sets of analyses were performed.  First, linear regression analyses were 
performed to test hypotheses 1-5, pertaining to simple (i.e. nonmediated) prediction by 
continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 6-9 were tested using mediation analyses in 
regression, following Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four-step procedure.  Lastly, 
hypotheses 10-13 were tested using moderated mediational analyses, employing the 
bootstrapping procedure and MODMED SPSS macro created by Preacher et al (2007). In 
all cases, effects reported are from analyses without controls, but have been replicated 
with controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).  
Hypotheses 1-5: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political 
expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 1) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was 
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centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses 
revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a 
significant predictor of political tolerance (B=.147, β=.167 SE=.056 p<.009; see Table 4).  
The effect of explicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 2) 
was tested using linear regression. Explicit democratic values support was centered an 
entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that explicit 
democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (B=.191, 
β=.216 SE=.055 p<.001; see Table 5).  
The effect of democratic values importance on tolerance was tested by centering 
importance and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression analyses indicated that 
democratic values importance was, in fact, a significant predictor of tolerance (B =.158, 
β=.181, SE=.055, p<.004, see Table 6).  
In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of explicit democratic values 
support (hypothesis 3). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly 
predict explicit support for democratic values, (B =.272, β=.270, SE=.062, p<.001, see 
Table 7).  
Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic values importance 
(hypothesis 4). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was not a significant 
predictor of importance of democratic values (B=.087, β=.046 SE=.124 p<.484, see Table 
8).  
Hypotheses 6-9: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertise-
tolerance relationship by explicit democratic values support (hypothesis 6) was tested 
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using Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four step procedure.  First, an as discussed above, a 
significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (B= .147, β= .167 SE= .056 
p<.009). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator, 
explicit support of democratic values, was confirmed (B =.272, β=.270, SE=.062, p<.001). 
Third, the effect of the mediator (explicit democratic values support) on tolerance was 
tested and found to be significant (B= .165, β= .188 SE= .057 p<.004).  Finally, the fourth 
condition for mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support 
(mediator) reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher 
and Leonardelli’s 2010 calculator; Z=-2.416; SE= .019; p< .01; see Figure 1).  Thus, 
explicit democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between 
expertise and tolerance.   
The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for 
importance of democratic values, as per hypothesis 8. As before, a significant effect of 
expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression (B =.137, β=.143, SE=.055, 
p<.010), meeting the first necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the 
effect of expertise on the mediator, explicit democratic values support, was also 
demonstrated when controlling for importance (B =.242, β=.265, SE=.062, p<.001). 
Third, the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and 
established (B =.225, β=.219, SE=.062, p<.001). Finally, the fourth condition for 
mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support (mediator) 
reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher and 
Leonardelli’s 2010 calculator; Z= -2.637; SE = .019; p< .008; see Figure 2). Thus, explicit 
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democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and 
tolerance, when controlling for democratic values importance.  
Next, mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by importance of 
democratic values was tested (hypothesis 7).  As before, a significant effect of expertise 
on tolerance was demonstrated using regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for 
establishing mediation (B =.137, β=.143, SE=.055, p<.010) Second, the effect of expertise 
on the mediator, importance of democratic values, was tested; however, expertise was 
not found to be a significant predictor of importance (B =.045, β=.046, SE=.064, p=.484). 
Thus, the second criterion for establishing mediation was not met, and as per Sobel’s 
(1982; see also Preacher & Leonardelli, 2010) procedure, the test concluded with no 
evidence of mediation by importance.  
Following this mediational test, mediation by importance while controlling for 
explicit support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 9). This time, the first 
criterion for establishing mediation was not met, as there was no significant effect of 
expertise on tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic values support (B =.103, 
β=.116, SE=.057, p<.074). However, since this effect was marginally significant, analyses 
proceeded to criterion two of establishing mediation. However, as above, there was no 
significant effect of expertise on the proposed mediator, importance, when controlling 
for explicit support (B =-.026, β=-.026, SE=.067, p=.701). Thus, the criteria for 
establishing mediation by importance were not met and analyses concluded.  
 Hypotheses 10-13: moderated mediation. First, hypothesis 10 and 12 were 
tested, which posited that the effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit 
  
 
59 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
support, but that this mediational path is itself moderated by democratic values 
importance. Analyses of these models followed Preacher et al’s (2007) procedure and 
utilized the authors’ (2007) moderated mediation testing macro for SPSS, MODMED.  
 According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008), 
there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is 
significant; b) there is a significant effect of the mediator on the DV; and if either (or 
both) of the following are met: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV and 
the moderator in predicting the mediator ;  or d) there is a significant interaction 
between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV. Once these prerequisites 
are met, the mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 
SD) levels of the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the 
indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined 
(see below for a description of how to interpret the indirect effect).  
 MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of 
the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (B =.137, 
β=.143, SE=.055, p<.010). Second, there was a significant effect of the mediator (explicit 
democratic values support) on the DV (B =.2187, SE=.056, p<.001; see Table 10). There 
was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator 
(importance) predicting the mediator (explicit support) (B =-.009, SE=.063, p=.882; see 
Table 9), though note that this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 10 (see 
Figure 3). However, there was a significant interaction between the mediator (explicit 
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support) and the moderator (importance) predicting the DV (B =-.1914, SE=.061, 
p<.002).  
 Given that the criteria for establishing moderated mediation were successfully 
met, the mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) 
levels of the moderator (importance), using Preacher et al’s (2007) MODMED macro for 
SPSS (see Table 11 for these estimated indirect effects). It should be noted, however, 
that when testing moderated mediation and estimating the mediational model at high 
and low levels of the moderator, the key score of interest (provided using MODMED 
analyses) is the indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, at both levels of the DV.  To 
those more familiar with simple mediational testing via the Sobel’s test, this should be 
clarified: the indirect effect reflects the extent of the reduction of the IV’s ability to 
predict the DV when the mediator’s effect on the DV is accounted for (for a given level 
of the moderator). In other words, a high, significant indirect effect score is a sign of a 
mediational model that is successful and accounts for a great deal of the IV’s effect on 
the DV. This is a direct inversion of what is typically observed in a simple mediational 
test, and which is tested by a Sobel’s test: whereas in simple mediation, it is typical to 
look at the IV’s ability to predict the DV by itself, and then look to see if the IV’s ability to 
predict the DV is diminished when the mediator is included in analyses (and thus a low 
coefficient in the final model is a sign of mediation), MODMED simply reports the 
indirect effect of the IV on the DV, via the mediator, and thus indicates the size of the 
reduction itself (and thus a high score is an indication of mediation).  
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 Analyses revealed that explicit support for democratic values did not 
significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when 
importance was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; B =-.008, SE=.022; Z=-.388; 
p>.69; see Table 11). However, explicit support for democratic values did significantly 
mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when importance of 
democratic values was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean B =-.104, SE=.046; 
Z=-2.26, p<.02). Thus, the mediational pathway tested (and supported) in hypotheses 6 
and 9 was found to be moderated by importance, in accordance with hypothesis 10, 
though not hypothesis 12 (see Tables 9, 10, and 11).  
 Next, hypotheses 11 and 13 were tested. These hypotheses proposed a 
moderated mediational model where the expertise-tolerance relationship is mediated 
by democratic values importance, but that this indirect effect is moderated by explicit 
democratic values support. MODMED analyses revealed, first, that in the full  model 
predicting the DV, expertise no longer remained a significant predictor (B =.091, β=.062, 
SE=.054, p=.095; see Table 12). This criteria for establishing moderated mediation being 
unmet, testing of the full model was discontinued.  
Study One Discussion 
 Study one examined thirteen main hypotheses. As anticipated, expertise was 
found to be a significant and strong predictor of political tolerance. Expertise was also 
revealed to be a significant predictor of explicit democratic values support, as 
anticipated, though it was not found to significantly predict democratic values 
importance. Explicit democratic values was found to significantly predict tolerance, and 
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importance of democratic values was found to significantly predict tolerance as well. 
All these effects are largely consistent with what was hypothesized (except for the lack 
of an effect of expertise on importance), and demonstrates that these predictors are 
related but distinct constructs, all of which contribute to an individual’s level of political 
tolerance. Bivariate correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all 
related, but distinct constructs. 
 In addition, it was found that explicit democratic values significantly mediated 
the relationship between expertise and tolerance. In other words, when accounting for 
the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance, the effect of expertise on 
tolerance was significantly diminished. This indicates that the effect of explicit support 
on tolerance partially accounts for the expertise-tolerance relationship, as hypothesized. 
Experts are, in part, more tolerant than political novices because they have higher 
explicit support for democratic norms such as freedom and equality under the law. This 
mediational path remained significant when democratic values importance was 
controlled for, as well.  
 Mediation by importance of democratic values, however, was not established. 
This was due to the fact that expertise did not have a significant effect on democratic 
values importance, precluding the possibility of mediation. This suggests that the 
expertise does not increase tolerance because it leads to greater subjective importance 
of democratic values, but simply by increasing explicit support for those values.  
 While one of the two main moderated mediational models was unsupported in 
this study, there was evidence for mediation by explicit support and mediation by 
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importance, as hypothesized. Specifically, it was found that when importance of 
democratic values was high, explicit democratic values support did mediate the 
relationship between expertise and tolerance. However, when democratic values 
importance was low, mediation by explicit support was no longer evident. This suggests 
that among individuals high in their subjective weighing of democratic values as an 
important and critical value worthy of consideration, part of the link between expertise 
and tolerance is accounted for by their explicit support of that value. However, among 
individuals who do not see democratic values as a critical and important value, the link 
between expertise and tolerance is not well accounted for by explicit democratic values 
support. In other words, explicit support for democratic values positively influences 
tolerance only when those values are seen as important. This implies that among 
experts who do not rank democratic values as important, some other factor must be 
contributing to their higher-than-average tolerance. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
STUDY TWO 
Overview 
 Study one provided some evidence that the expertise-tolerance relationship is 
mediated by explicit democratic values support, and that this mediational pathway 
might only occur when democratic values are seen as important. Study one also 
replicated previous findings that tolerance is predicted by expertise and explicit 
democratic values support, and provided new evidence that tolerance is predicted also 
by democratic values importance. Study two expands upon these findings by examining 
a more implicit measure, democratic value accessibility, as a predictor.  
 While many of the same predictors and potential controls were assessed in study 
two as in study one, democratic values importance was replaced in this study by 
democratic value accessibility.  This construct has never been previously examined as a 
predictor of tolerance in an empirical study, let alone as a possible mediator of the 
expertise-tolerance effect. Participants completed a word-completion measure 
assessing how inclined they were to think about democratic values (see Method section, 
below, for details on this measure). In addition, political expertise, explicit democratic 
values support, tolerance, and the same control variables as in study one were assessed. 
This study allowed, then, for the examination of several new hypotheses pertaining to 
democratic value accessibility, and also provided the opportunity to replicate study 
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one’s results involving the effects of expertise and explicit democratic values support. 
It was expected that democratic value accessibility would mediate the expertise-
tolerance relationship. Further, it was expected that democratic value accessibility 
might moderate the model in which explicit support served as a mediator of the 
expertise-tolerance relationship. Additionally, it was hypothesized that accessibility of 
democratic values might mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance, and 
that this mediational pathway might be moderated by explicit support.  
Hypotheses 
H14: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a 
strong positive predictor of tolerance. 
H15: Accessibility of democratic values will predict tolerance. 
H16: Explicit support of democratic values will predict tolerance.  
H17: Expertise will predict accessibility of democratic values. 
H18: Expertise will predict explicit support of democratic values.  
H19: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
accessibility of democratic values.  
H20: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
explicit support for democratic values.  
H21: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
accessibility of democratic values, when controlling for explicit support.  
H22: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
support for democratic values, when controlling for accessibility.  
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H23: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for 
democratic values for high accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on 
tolerance is not mediated by democratic values for low accessibility participants. This 
hypothesis presumes that accessibility of democratic values and expertise are not 
correlated, as per Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see 
Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail). 
H24: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high 
explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not 
mediated by accessibility for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes 
that explicit support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per 
Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation. 
H25: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high 
explicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not 
mediated by accessibility for low explicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes 
that support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and accessibility and 
expertise are correlated, and thus requires a different statistical procedure to be tested 
(Preacher et al, 2007).  
H26: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by explicit support for high 
accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated 
by explicit support for low accessibility participants. This hypothesis presumes that 
accessibility and expertise are correlated, and explicit support and expertise are 
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correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure to be tested (Preacher et al, 
2007).  
Methods 
Proposed Mediators: Accessibility of Democratic Values and Explicit Support for 
Democratic Values 
 In study two, the accessibility of democratic norms was assessed (using an 
adapted version of Greenberg et al’s 1994 death-thought accessibility measure), and 
analyzed as a predictor of political tolerance. In addition, explicit support for democratic 
values was measured in the same manner as study one. Accessibility of democratic 
values was measured prior to tolerance, explicit support, and expertise in this study, as 
consideration of tolerance judgments (or of political knowledge in general) might 
influence the salience of democratic values and increase accessibility if it were 
measured afterward, whereas the desired construct is how prone participants are to 
think of democratic values without such prompting. Explicit support for democratic 
values was measured after tolerance has been measured, as before.  
Accessibility of democratic values. The accessibility of democratic values in 
participants’ minds was assessed using an adapted version of Greenberg et al’s (1994) 
fill-in-the-blank accessibility test. Participants were given 26 partially-completed word 
stems, which they were instructed to complete as quickly as possible. Seven of the 
words fragments had several possible “correct” answers, one of which pertained to 
democratic norms and values ( e.g., __ R E E, which can be completed as either “free” or 
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“tree”; L __ W, which can be completed as either “law” or “low”), while the remaining 
19 word fragments had neutral “correct” answers  to mask the purpose of the measure.  
Results 
Participant Demographics 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (M=35.38, SD=13.761). Most 
participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (M=4.13, 
SD=1.674). Fifty-five percent of participants were male (N=142) and forty-one percent 
were female (N=113). All participants were American citizens (N=255) and ninety-six 
percent of participants reported English as their first language (N=247). Participants 
were moderate in their rate of political participation (M=3.85, SD=2.263). The most 
popular least-liked groups chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan (45.4%), Islamic 
Fundamentalists (16.2%), Tea Party Protesters (7.3%), Fascists (7.6%), Communists 
(4.4%), Anti-Abortionists (6.2%), and Pro-Abortionists (4%).  
Study two main analyses. Three sets of analyses were performed.  First, linear 
regression analyses were performed to test hypotheses 14-18, pertaining to simple (i.e. 
nonmediated) prediction by continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 19-22 were 
tested using mediation analyses in regression, following Baron and Kenney’s (1986) 
four-step procedure.  Lastly, hypotheses 23-26 were tested using moderated 
mediational analyses, employing the bootstrapping procedure and SPSS macro created 
by Preacher et al (2007). In all cases, effects reported are from analyses without 
controls, but have been replicated with controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).  
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Hypotheses 1-5: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political 
expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 14) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was 
centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses 
revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a 
significant predictor of political tolerance (B= .561, β= .372 SE= .088 p<.001; see Table 
14).  
The effect of explicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 16) 
was tested using linear regression. Explicit democratic values support was centered an 
entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that explicit 
democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (B= .932, β= 
.618 SE= .075 p<.0001; see Table 15).  
The effect of democratic value accessibility on tolerance (hypothesis 15) was 
tested by centering and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression analyses 
indicated that democratic value accessibility was, in fact, a significant predictor of 
tolerance (B =.207, β=.137, SE=.094, p<.029, see Table 16).  
In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of explicit democratic values 
support (hypothesis 18). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly 
predict explicit support for democratic values, (B =.425, β=.323, SE=.078, p<.001, see 
Table 17).  
Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic value accessibility 
(hypothesis 17). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was a significant 
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predictor of democratic value accessibility (B= .264, β= .292 SE= .054 p<.001, see 
Table 18).  
Hypotheses 19-22: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertise-
tolerance relationship by explicit democratic values support (hypothesis 20) was tested 
using Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four step procedure.  First, and as discussed above, a 
significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (B= .932, β= .618 SE=.075 
p<.0001). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator, 
explicit support of democratic values, was confirmed (B =.425, β=.323, SE=.078, p<.001). 
Third, the effect of the mediator (explicit democratic values support) on tolerance was 
tested and found to be significant (B =.838, β=.555, SE=.077, p<.001).  Finally, the fourth 
condition for mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support 
(the mediator) reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher 
and Leonardelli’s 2010 calculator; Z=4.891; SE=.055; p<001; see Figure 5).  Thus, explicit 
democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and 
tolerance.   
The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for 
accessibility of democratic values, as per hypothesis 22. As before, a significant effect of 
expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using regression (B =.548, β=.363, SE=.092, 
p<.001), meeting the first necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the 
effect of expertise on the mediator, explicit democratic values support, was also 
demonstrated when controlling for accessibility (B =.299, β=.299, SE=.062, p<.001). 
Third, the effect of explicit democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and 
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established (B =.839, β=.557, SE=.077, p<.001). Finally, the fourth condition for 
mediation was tested: controlling for explicit democratic values support (the mediator) 
reduced the effect of expertise on tolerance (Sobel, 1982, using Preacher and 
Leonardelli’s 2010 calculator; Z=4.41; SE =.057; p <.001; see Figure 6). Thus, explicit 
democratic values support partially mediated the relationship between expertise and 
tolerance, when controlling for democratic value accessibility.  
Next, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was tested (hypothesis 19).  
As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using 
regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for establishing mediation (B =.548, 
β=.363, SE=.092, p<.001) Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, accessibility of 
democratic values, was tested and confirmed (B =.264, β=.292, SE=.054, p<.001). Third, 
the effect of accessibility of democratic values on tolerance was again tested; however, 
this criterion for establishing mediation was not met (B =.047, β=.031, SE=.092, p=.611). 
Sobel’s test results indicated that controlling for the effect of accessibility on tolerance 
did not significantly reduce the effect of expertise on tolerance, therefore failing to 
provide support for mediation by accessibility (Z=.508; SE =.024; p=.611).  
Following this mediational test, mediation by accessibility while controlling for 
explicit support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 21). Again, the first criterion 
testing the effect of expertise on tolerance while controlling for explicit democratic 
values support was met (B =.291, β=.193, SE=.077, p<.001). Second, the effect of 
expertise on the mediator (accessibility) while controlling for explicit support was tested 
and met (B =.239, β=.265, SE=.057, p<.001). Third, the effect of the mediator 
  
 
72 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(accessibility) on the DV (tolerance) was tested. This criterion was not met (B =-.022), 
β=-.015, SE=.076, p=.770). Sobel’s test results further indicated that controlling for the 
effect of accessibility on tolerance did not significantly diminish the effect of expertise 
on tolerance, further disproving mediation (Z=-.288; SE =.018; p=.773).  
 Hypotheses 23-26: moderated mediation. Following the testing of the simple 
mediational models predicted in study two, hypothesized moderated mediational 
models were examined. First, hypotheses 23 and 25 were tested, as they both related to 
the same moderated mediational model. Theses hypotheses predicted that the 
relationship between expertise and tolerance would be mediated by explicit democratic 
values support, which would itself be moderated by democratic value accessibility (see 
Figure 7). Hypothesis 23 predicted that democratic value accessibility would not be 
related to expertise, whereas hypothesis 25 predicted the same moderated mediational 
model, but with a significant correlation between accessibility and expertise (again, see 
Figure 7 for the distinction).  
 According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008), 
there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is 
significant; b) there is a significant effect of the mediator on the DV; and if either (or 
both) of the following are met: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV and 
the moderator in predicting the mediator ;  or d) there is a significant interaction 
between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV. Once these prerequisites 
are met, the mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 
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SD) levels of the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the 
indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined.  
 MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of 
the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (B =.305, 
β=.291, SE=.081, p<.001). Second, there was a significant effect of the mediator (explicit 
democratic values support) on the DV (B =.8318, SE=.079, p<.001). Third, there was a 
significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (accessibility) 
predicting the mediator (explicit support) (B =-.198, SE=.062, p<.002), though note that 
this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 23 (see Figure 7). However, there was 
no significant interaction between the mediator (explicit support) and the moderator 
(democratic value accessibility) predicting the DV (B=.076, SE=.073, p=.302; see Tables 
19 and 20 for full model coefficients).  
 Accordingly, there was evidence for moderation of the path between expertise 
and the mediator (explicit support), providing some support for hypothesis 25. The 
mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of 
the moderator (accessibility), using Preacher et al’s (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS 
(see Table 21). Analyses revealed that explicit support for democratic values did, in fact, 
significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when 
accessibility was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; B=.353, SE=.079; Z=4.46; 
p<.001). However, explicit support for democratic values did not significantly mediate 
the relationship between expertise and tolerance when accessibility of democratic 
values was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; B=.065, SE=.086; Z=.752, 
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p=.452). This is the opposite of what was predicted in hypothesis 25, where explicit 
support was predicted to be a mediator when democratic value accessibility was high. 
Thus, the mediational pathway tested (and supported) in hypotheses 23 and 25 was 
found to be moderated by accessibility, though not in the pattern predicted a priori (see 
Tables 19, 20, and 21). 
 Next, the moderated mediational models predicted by hypotheses 24 and 26 
were tested. This model predicted that the relationship between expertise and 
tolerance would be mediated by democratic value accessibility, and that this 
mediational pathway would itself be moderated by participants’ level of explicit 
democratic values support (see Figure 8). Again, hypothesis 24 differed from hypothesis 
26 in that the former did not presume a significant relation between expertise (the IV) 
and explicit democratic values support (the moderator), whereas hypothesis 26 did 
predict such a relationship (see Figure 8). MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there 
was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already 
demonstrated previously (B=.340, SE=.082, p<.001). However, there was no significant 
effect of the mediator (democratic value accessibility) on the DV (B=-.001, SE=.077, 
p=.909). Third, there was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the 
moderator (explicit support) predicting the mediator (accessibility) (B=-.068, SE=.059, 
p=.252), though note that this interaction was predicted by hypothesis 26 but not 24 
(see Figure 8). In addition, there was no significant interaction between the mediator 
(accessibility) and the moderator (explicit support) predicting the DV (B=-.013, SE=.079, 
p=.866; see Tables 22 and 23 for full model coefficients). Since the criteria for 
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establishing moderated mediation were not met, the model was not estimated at 
high and low levels of the moderator (explicit support), and hypotheses 24 and 26 were 
not supported.  
Study Two Discussion 
 Thirteen hypotheses were examined in this study, some of which were 
replications of the hypotheses in study one, and some of which examined the impact of 
a new predictor, democratic value accessibility. As in study one, expertise was found to 
be a significant and strong predictor of political tolerance, even when other predictors 
were taken into account as control variables. Expertise was also found to significantly 
predict explicit democratic values support, as before. Expertise also significantly 
predicted democratic value accessibility in this study. In a direct replication of study one, 
explicit support for democratic values was found to predict political tolerance as well. In 
addition, accessibility of democratic values was found to significantly predict political 
tolerance. Bivariate correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all 
related, but distinct constructs. 
 Several mediational models were also examined in this study. In a direct 
replication of study one, explicit support for democratic values was found, once again, 
to mediate the relationship between expertise and political tolerance. This provided 
further support to the theoretical notion that experts are, in part, more tolerant 
because they value democratic norms more than do political novices. This mediational 
model also held when accessibility of democratic values was controlled for. Accessibility 
of democratic values was examined as a mediator, but was not supported. Similar to 
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study one’s results regarding mediation by importance of democratic values, the 
effect of accessibility of democratic values on tolerance did not significantly diminish the 
effect of expertise on tolerance.  
 Several moderated mediational models were also tested. Results indicated that 
the mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit democratic values was 
moderated by accessibility of democratic values. Namely, explicit support did mediate 
the expertise-tolerance relationship when accessibility was low, but this mediational 
path was no longer significant when accessibility was high. This finding is a bit curious, 
and runs in the opposite direction as what was hypothesized for this model. These 
results suggest that the relationship between expertise and tolerance is only accounted 
for by explicit support for democratic values when those values are not accessible to the 
individual forming the tolerance judgments. This may indicate that a ceiling effect 
occurs when democratic values are accessible; namely, that when individuals are able to 
readily and easily think of democratic values, they are more prone to provide tolerant 
responses, even if they are not political experts or people otherwise inclined to be 
tolerant. These results also make it clear that accessibility of democratic values is a 
distinct construct from either explicit democratic values support or expertise, though it 
is not as strong a predictor as these other two constructs.  
 Finally, mediation by accessibility and moderation by explicit support was 
examined. There was, however, no support for the notion that mediation by 
accessibility was moderated by explicit democratic values support. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
STUDY THREE 
Overview 
 Study two again provided support for mediation by explicit democratic values 
and replicated existing evidence that tolerance is influenced by political expertise and 
explicit democratic values support. Study two also examined a novel predictor that has 
never been tested in the past, democratic value accessibility , and found some support 
for the utility of this construct as a predictor of tolerance, if not as a mediator of the 
expertise-tolerance relationship.  
 Study three examined many of the same predictors as in study two, with the 
exception of explicit democratic values support, which had already been examined 
successfully as a predictor, mediator, and moderator in both study one and two. 
Instead, explicit democratic values support was replaced with implicit democratic values 
support, using an altered form of the IAT (see Method section, below, for details). As 
before, political tolerance, political expertise, and democratic value accessibility were 
recorded, as well as the same control variables as in studies one and two. Effects of 
democratic value accessibility were therefore replicated in this study. 
Implicit support for democratic values was examined as a predictor of tolerance, 
a mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, and a moderator of the hypothesized 
78 
 
 
 
mediation of the expertise-tolerance relationship by accessibility.  While implicit 
attitudes have been examined in a variety of domains in the social psychological 
literature, this study marks the first measurement and examination of implicit 
democratic values as an implicit attitude and as a predictor of political tolerance. It was 
anticipated that implicit support would significantly predict political tolerance and 
would significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance. It was 
hypothesized that implicit support for democratic values would moderate any 
mediation by accessibility of democratic values that was evident in this study (though it 
should be noted that accessibility was not a significant mediator in the previous study). 
Finally, it was hypothesized that accessibility of democratic values would moderate any 
mediation by implicit support.  
Hypotheses 
H27: In a direct replication of numerous previous studies, expertise will be a 
strong positive predictor of tolerance. 
H28: Implicit support for democratic values will predict tolerance. 
H29: Accessibility of democratic values will predict tolerance. 
H30: Expertise will predict implicit support for democratic values.  
H31: Expertise will predict accessibility of democratic values.  
H32: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
implicit support for democratic values. 
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H33: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
accessibility of democratic values. 
H34: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
accessibility of democratic values, when controlling for implicit support.  
H35: The relationship between expertise and tolerance will be mediated by 
implicit support for democratic values, when controlling for accessibility.  
H36: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by implicit support for 
democratic values for high accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on 
tolerance is not mediated by implicit democratic values for low accessibility participants. 
This hypothesis presumes that accessibility of democratic values and expertise are not 
correlated, as per Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation (see 
Proposed Statistical Treatment, below for detail). 
H37: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high 
implicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not 
mediated by accessibility for low implicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes 
that implicit support for democratic values and expertise are not correlated, as per 
Muller et al’s (2005) procedure for testing moderated mediation. 
H38: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by accessibility for high 
implicit support participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not 
mediated by accessibility for low implicit support participants. This hypothesis presumes 
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that implicit support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and that 
accessibility and expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure 
to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).  
H39: The effect of expertise on tolerance is mediated by implicit support for high 
accessibility participants. However, the effect of expertise on tolerance is not mediated 
by implicit support for low accessibility participants. This hypothesis presumes that 
implicit support for democratic values and expertise are correlated, and that 
accessibility and expertise are correlated, and requires a different statistical procedure 
to be tested (Preacher et al, 2007).  
Methods 
Proposed Mediators: Implicit Support for Democratic Values and Accessibility of 
Democratic Values 
In study three, participants’ implicit support for democratic values was assessed 
as a predictor of political tolerance, as well as accessibility of democratic values. As 
before, accessibility of democratic values was assessed first in this study, so it could not 
be influenced by the other questions. Implicit democratic values support was assessed 
after accessibility and tolerance, to prevent the implicit measure from having a priming 
effect or otherwise increasing the salience of democratic values in a manner that would 
influence either.  
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Implicit support for democratic values. The degree to which participants 
implicitly support democratic values was measured using an adapted form of the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGee, & 
Schwarz, 1998), based on the usage guidelines published in Nosek, Greenwald, and 
Banaji (2005), and implemented using the web-based, open-source software 
WINTERAMIAT by Allon (2013) . Participants were asked to group several sets of words 
that appeared on their computer screen into one of two appropriate categories using 
two keys on the keyboard; participants were asked to sort insects and flowers 
(“horsefly”; “tulip”) into separate categories while also being asked to sort nouns and 
verbs into “noun” and “verb” categories (Bosson, Swann, &Pennebaker, 2000; 
Greenwald &Farnham, 2000; Nosek et al., 2002; Rudman et al., 2001). Some of the 
nouns sorted were related to democratic values (e.g. “liberty”, “voter”), while most 
were unrelated to the political domain (e.g. pear, computer, sink) to prevent suspicion, 
and none of the verbs were related to democratic values (e.g. leap, sprint, climb). 
The IAT typically features five blocks of trials, with steps 3 and 5 providing the 
data to be analyzed; this study was no exception. In step 1, participants learned the first 
concept dimension. Participants were asked to sort items from two different concepts 
into their superordinate categories (e.g., photographs of specific insects for “Insect” and 
photographs of flowers for “Flower”). Categorization was performed using two keys on 
a computer keyboard that were mapped for the two categories (for example, the “a” 
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key for “Insect”, and the “;” key for “Flower”) This was performed for 20 trials, though it 
served as a training session and was not analyzed. In step 2, participants performed the 
same task, but with new superordinate categories and items (in this case, they sorted 
nouns and verbs into the “Noun” and “Verb” categories). Again, this step was a training 
session lasting 20 trials, and was not analyzed. In step 3, these two sorting tasks were 
combined so that respondents were asked to identify a photograph as either a “Flower” 
or “Insect”, followed by a word as either a “Noun” or “Verb”. In this step, one key (“a”) 
was the correct response for two categories (e.g., “Insect” and “Verb”) and the other 
key (“;”) was the correct response for the remaining two categories (“Flower” and 
“Noun”). Participants performed a block of 20 trials with these sorting rules (which 
served as a practice block). After a brief pause, they repeated it for a second block of 40 
trials (often referred to as the “critical” block, which were analyzed). In step 4, 
participants learned to switch the spatial location of the concepts, such that the 
stimulus items for the target concepts of interest (“Noun” and “Verb”) were sorted for 
20 trials, but with a reversed key assignment (i.e., if “Verb” was originally associated 
with the “;” key, it would now be associated with the “a” key, and vice versa). Finally, in 
step 5, respondents sorted items from both the attribute and target concept categories 
once more, the only difference being that the response key assignments now required 
“Insect” and “Noun” and “Flower” and “Verb” items to be categorized with one another, 
the opposite association from step 3. Respondents sorted stimulus items with this 
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response assignment for 20 (unanalyzed) practice trials, and then again for 40 more 
“critical” trials. 
Participants’ implicit support for democratic values were determined by 
examining differences in the reaction time in pairing democratic value words with 
flowers, relative to the pairing of democratic value words with insects, using the 
conventional IAT scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, &Banaji, 2003), which is 
calculated automatically by WINTERAMIAT. The IAT effect is calculated using latency 
data from Steps 3, using the software. Sorting the stimuli faster when democratic values 
terms (“Nouns”) are paired with “Flower” (i.e., when “Verb” is paired with “Insect”) 
than the reverse indicates a stronger association strength between democratic values 
and positively-valence things, compared to the reverse mapping, or in other words 
indicates an automatic preference for democratic values (Note: Greenwald et al., 2003, 
describe the scoring algorithm for calculating the IAT effect in detail). 
Results 
Participant Demographics 
 Participants ranged in age from 18 to 72 years (M=34.08, SD=12.692). Most 
participants reported a college degree as their highest level of education (M=4.20, 
SD=1.594). Fifty-two percent of participants were male (N=132) and forty-seven percent 
were female (N=118). All participants were American citizens (N=251) and ninety-six 
percent of participants reported English as their first language (N=242). Participants 
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were moderate in their political participation (M=3.57, SD=2.250). The most popular 
least-liked groups chosen by participants were: the Ku Klux Klan (43.6%), Islamic 
Fundamentalists (11.8%), Tea Party Protesters (11.6%), Fascists (8.4%), Communists 
(4.8%), Anti-Abortionists (6.4%), and Pro-Abortionists (3.6%).  
Study Three Main Analyses 
 Three sets of analyses were performed.  First, linear regression analyses were 
performed to test hypotheses 27-31, pertaining to simple (i.e. nonmediated) prediction 
by continuous variables. Second, hypotheses 32-35 were tested using mediation 
analyses in regression, following Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four-step procedure.  Lastly, 
hypotheses 36-39 were tested using moderated mediational analyses, employing the 
bootstrapping procedure and SPSS macro created by Preacher et al (2007). In all cases, 
effects reported are from analyses without controls, but have been replicated with 
controls (see Appendix C for these analyses).  
Hypotheses 27-31: simple linear regression analyses. The effect of political 
expertise on tolerance (hypothesis 27) was tested using linear regression. Expertise was 
centered and entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses 
revealed, consistent with hypothesis one, that political expertise was indeed a 
significant predictor of political tolerance (B= .392, β= .261 SE= .092 p<.001; see Table 
24).  
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The effect of implicit support for democratic values on tolerance (hypothesis 28) 
was tested using linear regression. Implicit democratic values support was centered an 
entered as a predictor of tolerance at Step 1. Regression analyses revealed that implicit 
democratic values support was indeed a significant predictor of tolerance (B= .207, β= 
.138 SE= .094 p<.029; see Table 25).  
The effect of democratic value accessibility on tolerance (hypothesis 29) was 
tested by centering the variable and entering it as a predictor at step 1. Regression 
analyses indicated that democratic value accessibility was, in fact, a significant predictor 
of tolerance (B =.203, β=.135, SE=.094, p<.032, see Table 26).  
In addition, expertise was examined as a predictor of implicit democratic values 
support (hypothesis 30). Regression analyses revealed that expertise did significantly 
predict implicit support for democratic values, (B =.315, β=.305, SE=.062, p<.001, see 
Table 27).  
Expertise was also examined as a predictor of democratic value accessibility 
(hypothesis 31). Regression analyses revealed that political expertise was not a 
significant predictor of democratic value accessibility (B= .013, β= .035 SE= .023 p=.580, 
see Table 28).   
Hypotheses 32-35: non-moderated mediation. Mediation of the expertise-
tolerance relationship by implicit democratic values support (hypothesis 32) was tested 
using Baron and Kenney’s (1986) four step procedure.  First, an as discussed above, a 
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significant effect of expertise on tolerance was documented (B= .392, β= .261 SE= .092 
p<.001). Second, and also as described above, the effect of expertise on the mediator, 
implicit support of democratic values, was evident (B =.315, β=.305, SE=.062, p<.001). 
Third, the effect of the mediator (implicit democratic values support) on tolerance was 
tested, and found to be nonsignificant (B =.097, β=.064, SE=.096, p=.317; see Figure 9). 
Adequate support for mediation by implicit democratic values support was therefore 
not found.  
The above mediational analyses were also reproduced when controlling for 
accessibility of democratic values, as per hypothesis 35. As before, a significant effect of 
expertise on tolerance (when controlling for democratic value accessibility) was 
demonstrated using regression (B =.399, β=.266, SE=.091, p<.001), meeting the first 
necessary criterion for establishing mediation. Second, the effect of expertise on the 
mediator, implicit democratic values support, was also demonstrated when controlling 
for accessibility (B =.316, β=.306, SE=.062, p<.001). Third, the effect of implicit 
democratic values support on tolerance was again tested and found to be nonsignificant 
(B =.091, β=.061, SE=.096, p=.341; see Figure 10). Mediation by implicit democratic 
values was therefore not supported.  
Next, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was tested (hypothesis 33).  
As before, a significant effect of expertise on tolerance was demonstrated using 
regression analyses, meeting the first criterion for establishing mediation (B= .392, β= 
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.261 SE= .092 p<.001) Second, the effect of expertise on the mediator, accessibility of 
democratic values, was tested and found to be nonsignificant (B =.013, β=.035, SE=.023, 
p=.580; see Figure 11). This criterion of establishing not met, analyzes testing this 
hypothesis were concluded.  
Following this mediational test, mediation by accessibility while controlling for 
implicit democratic values support was tested (in accordance with hypothesis 34). 
Again, the first criterion testing the effect of expertise on tolerance while controlling for 
implicit democratic values support was met (B= .362, β= .241 SE= .096 p<.001). Second, 
the effect of expertise on the mediator (accessibility) while controlling for implicit 
support was tested and was not significant (B =.015, β=.043, SE=.024, p=.521; see Figure 
12). Again, adequate evidence for mediation by accessibility was not found and tests of 
hypothesis 34 were concluded.  
 Hypotheses 36-39: moderated mediation. Following the testing of the simple 
mediational models predicted in Study three, hypothesized moderated mediational 
models were examined. First, hypotheses 36 and 39 were tested, as they both related to 
the same moderated mediational model. Theses hypotheses predicted that the 
relationship between expertise and tolerance would mediated by implicit democratic 
values support, and would be moderated by democratic value accessibility (see Figure 
13). Hypothesis 36 predicted that democratic value accessibility would not be related to 
expertise, whereas hypothesis 39 predicted the same moderated mediational model, 
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but with a significant correlation between accessibility and expertise (again, see Figure 
13 for the distinction).  
 According to Preacher et al (2007), Muller et al (2005), and MacKinnon (2008), 
there is evidence of moderated mediation if a) the effect of the IV on the DV is 
significant;  and if either (or both) of the following is evident: b) there is a significant 
effect of the mediator on the DV;  or: c) there is a significant interaction between the IV 
and the moderator in predicting the mediator ;  and d) there is a significant interaction 
between the moderator and the mediator predicting the DV (see Appendix B for a more 
in-depth explanation with relevant equations). Once these prerequisites are met, the 
mediational model is estimated by MODMED at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of 
the moderator, as well as when the moderator is at the mean, and the indirect effect of 
the IV, via the mediator, for each level of the moderator is examined (see below for a 
description of how to interpret the indirect effect).  
 MODMED analyses revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of 
the IV (expertise) on the DV (tolerance), as already demonstrated above (B =.365, 
β=.354, SE=.096, p<.001). Second, there was not a significant effect of the mediator 
(implicit democratic values support) on the DV (B =.119, SE=.096, p=.217). Third, there 
was not a significant interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator 
(accessibility) predicting the mediator (implicit support) (B =-.002, SE=.064, p=.971; see 
Table 29), though note that this interaction was not predicted by hypothesis 36 (see 
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Figure 13). However, there was a marginally significant interaction between the 
mediator (implicit support) and the moderator (democratic value accessibility) 
predicting the DV (B=.187, SE=.097, p=.055; see Table 30).  
 Accordingly, there was borderline evidence in favor of mediation by implicit 
support and moderation by accessibility and so the mediational model was estimated 
for participants both at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of the moderator 
(accessibility) using Preacher et al’s (2007) MODMED macro for SPSS (see Table 34 for 
indirect effect estimates). Analyses revealed that implicit democratic values did not 
significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when 
accessibility was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; B=-.0208, SE=.041; Z=-
.514; p=.6076). However, implicit democratic values did marginally mediate the 
relationship between expertise and tolerance when accessibility was low (-1 standard 
deviation below the mean; B=.094, SE=.054; Z=1.761, p<.078), the opposite of what was 
predicted in hypotheses 36 and 39.  
 Next, the moderated mediational model predicted by hypotheses 37 and 38 
were tested. This model predicted that the relationship between expertise and 
tolerance would be mediated by democratic value accessibility, and that this 
mediational pathway would itself be moderated by participants’ level of implicit 
democratic values support (see Figure 14). Again, hypothesis 37 differed from 
hypothesis 38 in that the former did not presume a significant relation between 
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expertise (the IV) and implicit democratic values support (the moderator), whereas 
hypothesis 38 did predict such a relationship (see Figure 14). MODMED analyses 
revealed, first, that there was in fact a significant effect of the IV (expertise) on the DV 
(tolerance), as already demonstrated previously (B=.380, SE=.094, p<.001). There was 
also a significant effect of the mediator (democratic value accessibility) on the DV (B=-
.197, SE=.089, p<.05). Third, there was not a significant interaction between the IV 
(expertise) and the moderator (implicit support) predicting the mediator (accessibility) 
(B=-.025, SE=.060, p=.682; see Table 31), though note that this interaction was predicted 
by hypothesis 37 but not 38 (see Figure 13). However, there was a significant interaction 
between the mediator (accessibility) and the moderator (implicit support) predicting the 
DV (B=-.182, SE=.093, p<.05; see Table 32).  
 The mediational model was then estimated for both high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) 
levels of the moderator (implicit support), using Preacher et al’s (2007) MODMED macro 
for SPSS (see Table 33 for indirect effect estimates). Analyses revealed that democratic 
value accessibility did not significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and 
tolerance when implicit support was low (-1 standard deviation below the mean; 
B=.001, SE=.014; Z=-.069; p=.954). However, democratic value accessibility did 
significantly mediate the relationship between expertise and tolerance when implicit 
democratic values support was high (+1 standard deviation above the mean; B=-.086, 
SE=.037; Z=-.163, p<.05). 
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Study Three Discussion 
 Thirteen hypotheses were tested in study three, some of which were replications 
of hypotheses examined in study two. As in all three studies, expertise was a significant 
predictor of tolerance. Expertise was also found to predict implicit democratic values 
support, also as hypothesized. However, expertise did not predict accessibility in this 
study, inconsistent both with hypotheses and with the results of study two.  
 Accessibility of democratic values was a significant predictor of political 
tolerance, replicating the results of study two. Further, implicit democratic values 
support was also a significant predictor of tolerance, as hypothesized. Bivariate 
correlational analyses revealed that these predictors were all related, but distinct 
constructs.  
 Mediational analyses revealed that implicit democratic values support was not a 
significant mediator of the expertise-tolerance relationship, counter to hypotheses. 
Additionally, mediation by accessibility of democratic values was not supported in this 
study, in a direct replication of study two, which is consistent with that study’s results 
but is inconsistent with hypotheses.  
 Next, moderated mediation was examined in this study. The first set of 
moderated mediational models, which involved mediation of the expertise-tolerance 
effect by implicit democratic values support and moderation by accessibility of 
democratic values, was marginally supported. Results indicated that, in accordance with 
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hypotheses 36 and 39, implicit democratic values support mediated the expertise-
tolerance relationship, but only among participants for whom these values were 
accessible. This suggests that while implicit support for democratic values are (by 
definition) not consciously considered, they still have an influence on tolerance 
judgments when those values are more accessible to participants.  The second set of 
moderated mediational analyses, involving mediation by democratic value accessibility 
and moderation by implicit democratic values support, was supported by analyses. 
Results indicated that the moderator, implicit democratic values support, did moderate 
the path from the mediator (accessibility) to the dependent variable (tolerance). 
Specifically, it was found that accessibility was not a significant mediator of the 
expertise-tolerance effect when implicit support for democratic values was low, but that 
it was a significant mediator when implicit democratic values support was high.  
These findings are consistent with hypotheses. These results suggest that when 
an individual has a positive automatic evaluation of democratic values, accessibility of 
those values helps to account for the relationship between expertise and tolerance. 
However, if an individual has a negative, or relatively less positive automatic attitude 
toward democratic values, the accessibility of those values does not help account for 
the relationship between political expertise and tolerance. In other words, the effect of 
expertise on tolerance is only partially accounted for by the accessibility of democratic 
values when those democratic values are implicitly evaluated in a positive way. This 
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means that among individuals with a negative automatic evaluation of democratic 
values, some other mediator must account for the strong link between expertise and 
tolerance, which is evident across all three studies. 
 
 
94 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Overview 
 The present set of three studies marks the first empirical examination of 
mechanism underlying the long-established relationship between political expertise and 
political tolerance. This research also serves as a useful replication of numerous existing 
effects in the political psychology literature, examining effects of democratic values 
support, ideology, and party on political tolerance, and effects of expertise and 
democratic values support on one another. In addition, this research introduces several 
constructs related to democratic values that have not been previously explored as 
predictors of tolerance (and mediators of the expertise-tolerance effect): implicit 
democratic values support, and democratic value accessibility. Due to the plethora of 
political psychological constructs examined in these studies, and due to the frequently 
close theoretical relationships between all these constructs, a number of correlations 
have been observed in this body of research, as well as several mediational relationships 
and moderated mediational relationships, some of which are consistent with the extant 
literature, and some of which are disparate or novel. 
 This research has the advantage of untangling many longstanding theoretical 
explanations as to why political expertise is associated with political tolerance through 
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the use of various related, but distinct constructs. In the past, it has been hypothesized 
that experts are more tolerant because they are more committed to tolerance than 
novices are, because they are more aware of the “rules of the game”, or because they 
are more likely to consider democratic values a relevant factor when forming tolerance 
judgments. However, these numerous possible mechanisms have never been treated as 
fully distinct and tested empirically; instead, researchers have examined simply whether 
increases in expertise via, for example, increased civics education, leads to a 
concomitant increase in tolerance (e.g. Golebiowska, 1995; Bobo & Licari, 1989; Vogt, 
1997; Knudsen, 1995). By devising specific measures that tap into some of these 
proposed mechanisms and analyzing them as potential mediators of the expertise-
tolerance relationship, this dissertation lays the groundwork for more specific, precise 
experimental research on increasing tolerance in the population.  
 In addition, this research has the advantage of using several large, relatively 
diverse and well-educated samples of Americans of voting age. Not only do the three 
samples vary widely in age (especially relative to an undergraduate population), they 
also exhibit strong variability in education level, political ideology, and even in their 
least-liked political groups (especially relative to student samples, which 
overwhelmingly select the KKK; see Price & Ottati, 2010). These participants are also far 
more politically involved and engaged than the average convenience sample, reporting 
an average of 2.4 political activities in the first study (including voting, volunteering for 
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campaigns, and contacting political representatives), and an average of 3.5 political 
activities in the second and third studies. This is in sharp contrast to student samples in 
particular, who often are only recently eligible to vote and frequently have not engaged 
in political activities in any significant way. This research is therefore much richer than 
typical, university-based survey research in political psychology, and exhibits greater 
ecological validity and generalizability to the actually voting population. When 
considering matters of free speech rights and commitment to political values, a 
population that is actually involved in politics is invaluable.  
 Because these samples are such rich potential sources of information, and 
because so many of the same  predictors were examined across the three studies as 
continuous predictors, it is useful first to compare and contrast the bivariate 
relationships between variables found in each of the three studies. These findings will 
also be compared and contrasted with the preexisting political psychology literature. 
Following this, the results of the simple mediational models examined in the present 
three studies will be examined and contrasted with one another (and with the extant 
literature). Finally, the results of the moderated mediational models tested in these 
three studies will be examined and discussed, and the overall results of the dissertation 
project, its limitations, and its implications for future research on political tolerance will 
be explored.  
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Bivariate Relations Between Variables 
 There is a notable internal consistency in the correlational and predictive 
relationships between variables found in these three studies. In all three studies, 
political expertise was a strong positive predictor of political tolerance, as was predicted 
and is consistent with the existing political psychological literature. Political tolerance 
was also consistently predicted by all the democratic values constructs examined in all 
three studies, including explicit and implicit support, accessibility, and importance, as 
was hypothesized. Also consistent with the existing political psychology literature, 
political expertise was strongly positively associated with education, age, and political 
participation in all three studies. This is consistent with findings going as far back as Sam 
Stouffer (1955) demonstrating that higher education tends to engender greater 
knowledge in the political domain (see, e.g. Bobo & Licari, 1989; Judd & Downing, 1990). 
Research also has demonstrated that participation and expertise tend to be correlated, 
though whether expertise engenders participation or vice versa is not entirely clear 
(Krosnick, 1990; McClurg, 2006). It makes sense, given the relationship between 
education and expertise and participation and expertise, that age is a positive predictor 
of expertise across all three studies, as people tend to become more educated and 
participate in politics more as they age (Zukin et al, 2006).  
 In studies two and three, political tolerance was also positively correlated with 
participation and education, which should come as no surprise given the strong 
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relationship between tolerance and political expertise, which is also strongly correlated 
with these constructs. Because of tolerance’s strong association with expertise (which 
itself appears to be engendered in part by education and participation), it comes as 
something of a surprise that these variables are not related to tolerance in study one 
(see results section). However, this may just be a quirk of the sample in study one, 
which also exhibits a smaller (but still large and positive) correlation between expertise 
and tolerance than is evident in the other two studies. Another theoretical inconsistency 
that is noteworthy is the significant negative correlation between political tolerance and 
political ideology evident in study three (indicating liberalism is associated with greater 
tolerance). Most research in political psychology indicates a nonsignificant relationship 
between political ideology (and party) and political tolerance, especially when Sullivan 
et al’s (1982) least-liked procedure is used, as it controls for effects of ideology on target 
group attitudes (Sullivan et al, 1981; Sullivan & Marcus, 1993; Price & Ottati, 2010). 
However, there is some research indicating that ideology is sometimes related to 
tolerance, including in other countries where free speech rights are not as vaulted as 
they are in the US (e.g., Israel; Shamir & Sullivan, 1983) and when ideology is related to 
tolerance, it is in the pattern observed in study three, with conservatives exhibiting less 
tolerance than liberals (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Mueller, 1988; Goren, 2005). 
Therefore, the modest correlation between ideology and tolerance exhibited in one of 
the three studies is not necessarily cause for alarm or suspicion that the sample in that 
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study is inappropriate; however, it does indicate that there is some variability between 
these three mTurk sample populations, even though they were collected in a similar 
manner at roughly the same time.  
 In most cases, hypotheses involving expertise and the other political constructs 
were supported. Expertise is significantly positively correlated with implicit and explicit 
democratic values support in all instances, as hypothesized.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
expertise is not associated with democratic values importance in study one (the only 
study in which importance was measured).  Neither is importance associated with 
explicit democratic values support in study one (which was not hypothesized explicitly). 
Despite these two rather surprising null effects, importance of democratic values is, in 
fact, a significant positive predictor of political tolerance. This indicates that an 
individual’s subjective weighting of democratic values as important accounts for some 
unique variance in the individual’s level of political tolerance. This points to the 
necessity of untangling importance and explicit support as unique predictors and 
possible mechanisms of the expertise-tolerance effect, one of the major advantages of 
these three studies over existing theoretical work on this topic. Importance of 
democratic values, long hypothesized to be a possible mechanism underlying the 
expertise-tolerance relationship, is shown instead to be a predictor of tolerance wholly 
unrelated to expertise in this study. This effectively allows for one of the possible 
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mediators of the expertise-tolerance relationship to be ruled out (see the discussion of 
moderated mediational models, below, for greater detail).  
Also worthy of note is the fact that expertise is positively correlated with 
democratic value accessibility in study two but not in study three. Future research  
should attempt to replicate the relationship between these constructs that was 
apparent in study two, to determine whether it is a true relationship or simply a type I 
error in that study. Theoretically, it makes sense that those who are knowledgeable 
about politics are more prone to call democratic values to mind in a neutral, nonpolitical 
task (such as a word completion test, as in these two studies); however, accessibility of 
an abstract construct such as democratic values can also be subtly influenced by a 
myriad cues and primes preceding the accessibility measure that are not related to 
participants’ actual political attitudes and predilections. Relatedly, democratic value 
accessibility was found to be significantly positively correlated with explicit democratic 
values in study two, but not with implicit democratic values in study three. The 
relationship between democratic value accessibility and tolerance is also more modest 
than the other predictors of tolerance examined in these three studies (explicit and 
implicit democratic values support, expertise, and importance of democratic values). All 
of these results serve to bolster the notion that accessibility is not caused as consistently 
by participants’ political attitudes and demographics as the other political constructs 
are. This makes sense theoretically; accessibility of an abstract construct is more fleeting 
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and more readily influenced by irrelevant external cues than any of the other constructs 
are.  
The remaining significant bivariate relationships uncovered in these three 
studies are fairly typical of the political psychology literature. As is usually the case, 
political ideology and political party are strongly positively correlated in all studies. Party 
and ideology are also consistently negatively correlated with both implicit and explicit 
democratic values support (indicating that conservatives and Republicans express less 
support for democratic values). Age and ideology are positively correlated, indicating 
greater conservatism among older participants (see, e.g., Van Hiel et al 2000 for similar 
results). Other than the instances noted above, there is a great deal of consistency 
between the three studies, and with the extant literature in general, which speaks to 
the validity of the mTurk sample.  
Simple Mediation Results 
 The results of these three studies also allow for some of the proposed 
mediational pathways explored in the introduction of this paper to be ruled out as 
possible mechanisms underlying the expertise-tolerance relationship, and for other 
possible mechanisms has provided some preliminary empirical support. Both study one 
and study two demonstrate strong evidence for mediation of the expertise-tolerance 
effect by explicit democratic values support. In both studies, controlling for the effect of 
explicit support on tolerance causes the effect of expertise on tolerance to drop into 
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nonsignificance; furthermore, this mediational path remains significant when controlling 
for importance of democratic values (in study one) and accessibility of democratic 
values (in study two).  This provides a great deal of support to the existing, but until this 
point purely theoretical notion expressed in the political psychology literature that 
experts are more tolerant because they have more respect for the “rules of the 
democratic game” (Sullivan et al, 1993; Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Furthermore, the 
consistency of this effect across studies further supports the finding, as does the extent 
to which explicit support eradicates the expertise-tolerance effect; by conventional 
metrics, explicit support can be said to fully mediate the effect of explicit support on 
tolerance (Rucker et al, 2011).  
 Other simple mediational models tested in these studies fared less well. In study 
one, democratic values importance was a significant predictor of tolerance, but 
expertise was not a predictor of importance, obviating the possibility of mediation. This 
suggests that importance of democratic values accounts, perhaps, for some unique 
variance in tolerance that is not accounted for by either expertise or explicit democratic 
values support. Future research should attempt to replicate this null mediational effect 
and attempt to discern which political variables do actually contribute to a voter’s 
subjective rating of the importance of democratic values, if not expertise or explicit 
support of those same values. No other political constructs in these studies predicted 
democratic values importance; further research should examine whether, for example, 
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civics education or social capital influence democratic values importance, as has been 
theorized (Putnam, 2001; Sullivan & Transue, 1999).  
 Results were also tepid on mediation by accessibility of democratic values. In 
study two, accessibility was found to not be a mediator of the expertise-tolerance 
relationship, because accessibility did not remain a significant predictor of tolerance 
when expertise was included in analyses (and because the effect of expertise on 
tolerance did not significantly diminish when accessibility was included in analyses). In 
study three, expertise was not a significant predictor of accessibility of democratic 
values (see above discussion), so mediation by accessibility was also not supported in 
that study.  This lack of support for mediation by accessibility was also apparent when 
controlling for explicit support (in study two) and implicit support (in study three). Thus, 
while further research may be warranted to determine whether expertise and 
accessibility are truly related (given the inconsistency between studies) there is little 
support for mediation of the expertise-tolerance effect by this construct.  
 Finally, implicit support for democratic values was explored as a mediator, and 
also failed to account for the expertise-tolerance relationship. Study three results 
demonstrated that while implicit democratic values support did predict tolerance, it did 
not remain a significant predictor of the DV when expertise was included in analyses, 
precluding the possibility of mediation. Further, the effect of expertise on tolerance did 
not diminish when the effect of implicit support was accounted for; rather, the effect of 
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expertise actually increased. Future research should attempt to replicate this effect to 
be certain, as there is a notable effect of implicit support on tolerance, though there is 
no support for this mediational pathway at this juncture. The results of the three studies 
are thus quite consistent: explicit support for democratic values seems, far and away, to 
best account for the relationship between expertise and tolerance that is so 
longstanding in the political psychology literature.   
Moderated Mediation 
 Because several mediational pathways hypothesized in studies one, two, and 
three were not supported empirically, many of the related hypothesized moderated 
mediational models were also unsupported. Moderated mediation where importance 
served as a mediator in study one, for example, were entirely unsupported due to the 
fact that expertise was not a significant predictor of importance in the simple 
mediational model. However, a model where importance of democratic values 
moderated the mediation by explicit democratic values was still theoretically and 
empirically possible, and was tested in study one; results indicated that importance of 
democratic values did, in fact, moderate the mediational pathway. Specifically, explicit 
support for democratic values was found to not mediate the expertise-tolerance 
relationship when importance was low; whoever, when importance of democratic 
values was high, explicit democratic values support did significantly mediate the 
expertise-tolerance relationship.  
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This finding was predicted by hypothesis 10 (see introduction) and makes 
intuitive theoretical sense. Experts, who generally are more likely to support democratic 
values, only allow those values to influence their tolerance judgments when they deem 
the values to be important enough. When experts are supportive of democratic values 
but do not deem democratic values to be as importance (for example, if they value 
public order or public decency to a greater extent than equality under the law), they do 
not allow those values to influence their tolerance attitudes. Future research should 
examine which factors do mediate the expertise-tolerance relationship when 
importance is low, and should examine the effect of other value importance ratings 
(such as the aforementioned public safety or decency values) to determine what factors 
are considered relevant to tolerance judgments by participants who deem democratic 
values to not be the paramount value.  
Study two presented moderated mediational results that are much more difficult 
to parse. Tests of hypotheses 23 and 25 established that accessibility did moderate the 
mediation by explicit democratic values support, as predicted; however, the pattern of 
results ran counter to what was hypothesized. Specifically, explicit democratic values 
support mediated the expertise-tolerance relationship when democratic value 
accessibility was low, but not when it was high. This runs counter to the hypothesized 
effect predicted by hypotheses 23 and 25. These results suggest that explicit democratic 
values support accounts for the effect of expertise on tolerance, but only when those 
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democratic values are not being readily considered/accessed by the participant. This 
implies that among experts, democratic values influence attitudes only when those 
value is inaccessible, which is inconsistent with the hypotheses and does not make much 
sense. One alternate explanation for this pattern of results is that when accessibility of 
democratic values is high, individuals are more likely to express tolerant positions, 
regardless of their actual degree of explicit support for those values. This jibes 
somewhat with the finding observed in previous research that tolerance is often an 
automatic “knee-jerk” for experts, rather than an effortful weighing of competing 
factors and values (e.g. Price & Ottati, 2010, Kuklinski et al, 1993). Future research 
should attempt to replicate this effect, especially in light of the fact that the relationship 
between accessibility and expertise is not consistent between studies two and three.  
Study two results failed to support the alternate moderated mediational models 
predicted in hypotheses 24 and 26, which posited mediation by accessibility and 
moderation by explicit support.  
Finally, study three examined mediation by implicit democratic values support 
and moderation by accessibility. This moderated mediational model was ultimately  not 
supported, however, due to a lack of an effect of the mediator (implicit support) on the 
DV, as well as the lack of an interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator 
(accessibility) predicting the mediator (implicit support). Thus, accessibility was not 
found to behave as a moderator when implicit democratic values served as a mediator, 
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despite the fact that it was a significant moderator of mediation by explicit support in 
study two. However, the failure of this moderated mediational model can be accounted 
for by the fact that in this study a) implicit support did not mediate the effect of 
expertise on tolerance, and b) expertise did not significantly predict accessibility of 
democratic values. Again, future research should examine this model further, or at least 
attempt to replicate the underlying findings, especially since the findings in study two 
ran counter to hypotheses.  
Study three also examined mediation by accessibility and moderation by implicit 
democratic values support. There was sufficient empirical support for this model, 
specifically the model where implicit support moderated the pathway between 
accessibility and tolerance. Results indicated that accessibility did mediate the expertise-
tolerance relationship when implicit democratic values support was high, but not when 
implicit democratic values support was low. This suggests that experts’ automatic, 
implicit evaluations of democratic values only influenced their tolerance judgments 
when those automatic values were actually readily accessible to them, but not when 
such values were not readily accessed. This is essentially consistent with hypothesis 37 
and makes intuitive theoretical sense. However, it is inconsistent somewhat with the 
results of study two, which found that explicit support only mediated the expertise-
tolerance relationship when accessibility was low. However, since the mediators in 
question here are quite distinct (explicit versus implicit support) in both measurement 
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and in their relationship with the other variables in these studies, neither result 
necessarily invalidates or calls into question the other. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Overview 
The present research proposed and tested several possible mechanisms 
underlying the relationship between expertise and tolerance, which were inspired by 
both political psychological and social psychological theoretical work that had not, to 
date, been empirically examined. The results of these studies help to rule out some of 
the proposed mechanism and have provided strong support for others. While tolerance 
is influenced to some degree by explicit support of democratic values, implicit support 
of democratic values, important of democratic values, and accessibility of democratic 
values, most of these constructs do not account for the relationship between expertise 
and tolerance to any significant degree. Across multiple studies, explicit democratic 
values support was found to be the only significant mediator of the expertise-tolerance 
effect, while the other three potential mediators were not supported. This suggests that 
experts are, as hypothesized by many, more tolerant by virtue of the greater 
endorsement of values such as freedom of speech and equality under the law. 
These results should be used to inform future empirical research on the ways in 
which tolerance can be increased in the population.  Past research has suggested that
 one of the methods by which tolerance can be increased is through increased education 
in general (e.g. Bobo & Licari, 1989), or increased civics education in particular (Sullivan 
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& Transue, 1999), because the resultant increases in political expertise seemed to drive 
an increase in political tolerance. While this remains a reasonable approach, increasing 
individuals’ support for democratic norms and values may be a more direct tactic; at the 
very least, these results suggest that civics education programs should place emphasis 
on the centrality of democratic norms to the functioning of a healthy democratic 
system, rather than on other aspects of the democratic process or on procedural facts, if 
the goal is to increase tolerance.  
The results of these studies also shed some light on more complex relationships 
between multiple political predictors. As stated above, mediation by explicit democratic 
values support was found quite clearly to be moderated by importance of democratic 
values. That is, explicit democratic values support only accounts for the relationship 
between expertise and tolerance when democratic values are upheld by the expert as 
important values worthy of consideration. This indicates that simple endorsement of 
democratic values is not enough; these values must be vaulted and seen as paramount 
in order for them to influence tolerance. This has been suggested previously by the 
Flexible Deliberation Model of Political Tolerance (Price & Ottati, 2010), which posits 
that tolerance judgments inherently involve numerous competing values, and the 
attitude at which a person arrives may depend a great deal on which values or factors 
they deem worthy of consideration. This result also should inform future research and 
possibly public policy: again, simple civics education may not be sufficient to bolster 
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tolerance, for democratic values must not only be taught and accepted, but seen as 
crucial values that are more important than other competing values.  
Moderated mediational results in these studies also suggest that the mediation 
of the expertise-tolerance relationship by explicit support is moderated by accessibility 
of democratic values. Study two results, while unhypothesized, indicate that individuals’ 
explicit democratic values support influences tolerance only when those values are not 
readily accessible. Future research should attempt to replicate this effect; importantly, 
future research must determine whether political expertise and accessibility are, in fact, 
related or not, as there was some inconsistency in the results of these studies. If the 
results of study two are supported by additional studies, some theoretical work will be 
necessary to make sense of how a value can be most influential when it is inaccessible; 
in particular, research might attempt to manipulate the accessibility of democratic 
values directly rather than measure it as an temporary individual difference, to see if 
this pattern holds.  
Last, results of study three indicated that implicit support may only mediate the 
expertise-tolerance relationship when accessibility of democratic values is high (though 
the results of study two suggest the reverse). Again, this result seems inconsistent with 
the results of study two, and additional work is necessary to determine the exact 
relationship between expertise, accessibility, democratic values support (both explicit 
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and implicit), and tolerance. However, the results of study three do make the greatest 
theoretical sense of the two disparate findings.  
Implications and Future Directions 
These studies demonstrate that expertise, long vaunted as one of the premier 
predictors of tolerance, has a far more complex relationship with the construct that has 
previously been examined. In large part, the effect of expertise on tolerance is 
accounted for by explicit endorsement of democratic values. This is especially the case 
when democratic values are both supported and seen as important values worthy of 
consideration when forming judgments. Future research should determine the best 
method by which explicit support for democratic values can be increased, in order to 
find useful methods of increasing tolerance in the voting population. Some possibilities 
include improved education, improved civics education, persuasive materials about the 
value and importance of democratic values, increased social capital, and increased trust 
in the government or political system (see, e.g. Putnam, 2000; 2001). 
 In addition, future experimental research should examine ways of increasing 
subjective importance of democratic values, using some of the same methods, as well as 
simple persuasive messages regarding the value of democratic norms in society.  Not 
only should this be examined as a permanent persuasive goal; experimental work 
should also work on developing methods of enticing participants to temporarily 
consider democratic values a relevant and important factor when forming tolerance 
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judgments in the short-term. Priming methods, explicit directions, group discussions 
about the importance of democratic values, and persuasive materials are among some 
of the options. In a similar vein, accessibility of democratic values should be 
experimentally manipulated as well, using priming methods or value rehearsal, to see if 
there are short-term increases in tolerance as a result. Research should also examine 
and confirm the relationship between expertise and accessibility of democratic values, 
both as an individual difference and manipulated variable.  
Finally, additional research should examine in greater detail the relationship 
between education (both general and civics-based) and participation, expertise, 
democratic values support, and political tolerance. Existing research as well as the 
present sets of studies strongly suggests that there is a strong, significant positive 
relationship between all of these predictors and tolerance. The exact directionality of 
their relationships is, however unknown. It is likely, for example, that education 
promotes both political expertise and democratic values support, both of which lead to 
greater tolerance, but the exact path is, as of yet, untested. For example, general 
education might increase expertise in a variety of domains, including political expertise, 
which might in turn influence tolerance. However, civics education might influence both 
political expertise and democratic values support, which might in turn promote 
tolerance. Mediational pathways of this sort should be tested; in addition, experimental 
or quasi-experimental designs should be employed to determine whether increased 
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knowledge leads to greater tolerance, and whether this is accounted for by expertise or 
democratic values support.  
Similar research should be conducted to clarify the role of political participation. 
In all three of the present studies, political participation was related to tolerance and 
expertise. This finding is not new (see Introduction). However, the directionality of the 
relationship is somewhat ambiguous and worthy of deeper exploration. For example, 
individuals who are already quite knowledgeable about politics might be more inclined 
to both participate in politics and provide tolerant responses; in such case, participation 
may have no causal role in tolerance whatsoever. However, the act of participating in 
politics could also conceivably influence a voter’s understanding of the political 
landscape, inform their attitudes regarding democratic values, and boost or diminish 
their tolerance as a result. For example, working at the polls might expose a voter to 
other volunteers who are committed to the democratic process, but who differ from 
themselves in political attitudes. This experience of participation could increase political 
tolerance directly, or it might indirectly increase tolerance by increasing support for 
democratic values. Future research should employ both survey and experimental 
methodologies to examine the predictors of participation, as well as its effects.  
Limitations 
 The results of these studies do come with a few caveats. First are the limitations 
of the sample: these participants were all mTurk users of eligible voting age in the 
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summer of 2013, with computer access, United-States-based IP addresses, and 
citizenship and English proficiency. Accordingly, this sample probably has greater 
education, income, and political interest than the average American voter. Research on 
mTurk user demographics suggest as much (Ross et al, 2010; Buhrmester et al, 2011) 
and also indicate that mTurk users are highly cognitively motivated and take part in 
online surveys in part for entertainment and educational purposes. Voting-age adults 
who do not have access to a computer, do not know about mTurk, or who are 
disinterested in such activities are thus excluded from the sample, which may influence 
the pattern of results. While the mTurk sample is far more diverse in age, region of the 
country, and education than are typical student samples, additional research should be 
conducted to replicate these results in different, more representative populations.  
 This research is also limited by the discrepancy between results in studies two 
and three, most notably regarding the effect of expertise on accessibility (or rather, the 
lack of one in study three). Study three is also anomalous in the sense that, in that 
sample, ideology is found to be related to political tolerance, which has not generally 
been found in related studies, including other studies using mTurk not included in this 
dissertation (e.g. Price & Ottati 2010; Price & Ottati 2012). Also surprising is the results 
of the moderated mediational model found to be significant in study two, which has 
already been discussed at length. Due to these limitations, replication is a must, 
including potentially replication using a different sample population.  
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 A final limitation is the correlational nature of this data. Since these studies 
represented the first empirical examinations of the mechanisms underlying the 
expertise-tolerance relationship, and since the constructs theorized to be relevant were 
political individual differences, it made sense to first examine these predictors as 
continuous, measured variables rather than manipulating them experimentally. 
However, now that these results have been analyzed, experimental research into the 
same mediational effects is a prudent next step.  
Conclusion 
 Mass public intolerance is a longstanding problem that has vexed political 
scientists and psychologists alike for many decades. Throughout years of survey and 
experimental study, several facts about tolerant individuals have reliably been 
demonstrated: tolerant people have greater political knowledge, and they express 
greater support for the democratic values that underlie tolerance itself. This research 
represents an initial test of what has long been suggested by the literature: expertise 
engenders tolerance because it also engenders a greater commitment to democratic 
norms. This research has tested a variety of possible mechanisms and has yielded 
several clear findings that should inform future research into political tolerance, as well 
as future attempts at bolstering tolerance in the lay populace. The research has also 
established several relationships that are in need of further experimental inquiry. These 
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results will inform a continuing program of research focused on the antecedents to 
tolerance.  
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study One 
 Tolerance Explicit 
Support 
Expertise Democratic 
Values 
Importance 
Education Age Participation Ideology Party Attitude 
Least Liked 
Tolerance 1.00          
Explicit 
Support 
.216** 1.00         
Expertise .167** .270** 1.00        
Democratic 
Values 
Importance 
.181* .086 .046 1.00       
Education .061 .216** .401** .027 1.00      
Age .073 .066 .358** .131* .243** 1.00     
Participation .029 .156* .344** -.094 .180* .035 1.00    
Ideology .058 -.022 .018 .056 .007 .133* -.109 1.00   
Party .047 -.020 -.047 .021 -.042 .042 -.110 .794** 1.00  
Attitude 
Least Liked 
-.105 -.037 -.020 .025 .023 -.043 -.015 .056 .023 1.00 
 + marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; ** significant at the p<.01 level.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
2
0 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study Two 
 Tolerance Explicit  
Support 
Expertise Democratic 
Values 
Accessibility  
Education Age Participation Ideology Party Attitude 
Least 
Liked 
Tolerance 1.00          
Explicit 
Support 
.618** 1.00         
Expertise .372** .323** 1.00        
Democratic 
Values 
Accessibility  
.137** .170** .292** 1.00       
Education .249** .076 .366** .038 1.00      
Age .017 .030 .246** .066 .217** 1.00     
Participation .252** .193** .366** .118 .325** .089 1.00    
Ideology -.122 -.204** .007 .015 .040 .148* -.132 1.00   
Party -.041 -.163** .022 .042 .097 .113 .021 .751** 1.00  
Attitude 
Least Liked 
-.900 -.025 -.080 -.113 .050 -.047 -.065 .079 .041 1.00 
 + marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; ** significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix For Continuous Variables Analyzed In Study Three  
 Tolerance Implicit 
Support 
Expertise Democratic 
Values 
Accessibility  
Education Age Participation Ideology Party Attitude 
Least 
Liked 
Tolerance 1.00          
Implicit 
Support 
.138* 1.00         
Expertise .261** .305** 1.00        
Democratic 
Values 
Accessibility  
.135* .012 .035 1.00       
Education .170** .056 .268** -.047 1.00      
Age .045 .244** .365** .093 .172* 1.00     
Participation .287** .250** .440** .043 .323** .292** 1.00    
Ideology -.182* -.144** -.050 .151 -.121 .087 -.233** 1.00   
Party -.025 -.049** .068 .099 -.132 .066 -.153* .774** 1.00  
Attitude 
Least Liked 
-.045 -.184** -.247** -.038 -.129* -.058 -.249** .125* .058 1.00 
 + marginally significant at p<.10 level; * significant at the p<.05 level; **significant at the p<.01 level.
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Table 4. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study One 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 4.082** .056 - 
Expertise .147* .056 .167* 
R² .130 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 5. Explicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study One  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 4.081** .055 - 
Explicit 
Democratic 
Values 
Support 
.191* .055 .216* 
R² .216 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
Table 6. Importance Of Democratic Values Predicting Tolerance In Study One 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 4.089** .055 - 
Importance of 
Democratic 
Values 
.158* .055 .181* 
R² .181 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 7. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study One 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant -.015** .062 - 
Expertise .272** .062 .270* 
R² .073 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 8. Expertise Predicting Importance Of Democratic Values In Study One  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.539** .125 - 
Expertise .087 .124 .046 
R² .046 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Figure 1. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise 
And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study One 
 
The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while 
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
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Figure 2. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise 
And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling 
For Importance) 
 
The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while 
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Moderated Mediation Model Specified In Hypotheses 10 And 12 
 
 
 
Table 9. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model 
Specified In Hypotheses 10 And 12 (Study One)                                                               
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant -.001** .062 - 
Expertise .263** .063 .167** 
Expertise x 
Importance 
-.066 .063 .056 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 10. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation 
Model Specified In Hypothesis 10 And 12 (Study One)  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 4.073** .053 - 
Expertise .094* .055 .082* 
Importance .183** .057 .161** 
Expertise x 
Importance 
-.003 .056 .001 
Explicit 
Support 
-.219** .056 .184** 
Explicit 
Support x 
Importance 
-.191** .061 .185** 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 11. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In Hypothesis 
10 And 12 (Study One) 
Importance Indirect 
Effect 
SE  Z P> Z 
-1 SD (-.9824) -.0084 .0216 -.3879 .6981 
Mean (.0122) -.0582** .0206 -2.8211** .0048 
- 1 SD 
(1.0067) 
-.1044** .0463 -2.2578** .0240 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Figure 4. The Moderated Mediation Model Specified By Hypotheses 11 And 13  
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Model Specified In Hypotheses 11 
And 13 (Study One) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .0323** .068 - 
Expertise .023 .069 -.033 
Expertise x 
Explicit 
Support 
.074 .062 -.063 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 13. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation 
Model Specified In Hypothesis 11 And 13 (Study One)  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 4.098** .055 - 
Expertise .091 .054 .082 
Importance .174* .057 .161* 
Expertise x 
Explicit 
Support 
.093 .050 .097 
Explicit 
Support 
-.239** .057 -.220** 
Explicit 
Support x 
Importance 
-.1890* .058 -.185* 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 14. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study Two  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 4.937** .088 - 
Expertise .561** .088 .372** 
R² .139 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 15. Explicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study Two  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.937** .074 - 
Explicit 
Democratic 
Values 
Support 
.932* .075 .618* 
R² .382 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 16. Democratic Value Accessibility Predicting Tolerance In Study Two 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.937** .094 - 
Democratic 
value 
accessibility  
.207* .094 .137* 
R² .019 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 17. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study Two  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 5.465** .078 - 
Expertise .425** .078 .323** 
R² .104 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 18. Expertise Predicting Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Two  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 1.165** .054 - 
Expertise .264** .054 .292** 
R² .085 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Figure 5. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise 
And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support In Study Two 
 
The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while 
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
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Figure 6. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise 
And Tolerance As Mediated By Explicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling 
For Accessibility) In Study Two 
 
The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while 
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
 
Figure 7.  The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 23 And 25  
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Table 19. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model 
Specified In Hypotheses 23 And 25 (Study Two) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .058 .061 - 
Expertise .269** .062 .188** 
Accessibility .126 .063 .132 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
-.198** .062 .195** 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 20. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation 
Model Specified In Hypothesis 23 And 25 (Study Two) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.945** .077 - 
Expertise .305** .081 .297** 
Accessibility -.014 .079 -.012 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
-.068 .082 -.064 
Explicit 
Support 
.832** .079 .823** 
Explicit 
Support x 
Accessibility 
.076 .073 .069 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 21. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In 
Hypotheses 23 And 25 (Study Two) 
Accessibility Indirect 
Effect 
SE  Z P> Z 
-1 SD  .353** .079 4.464** .0000 
Mean  .224** .056 4.018** .0001 
- 1 SD  .065 .086 .752 .4519 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Figure 8. The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 24 And 26 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model 
Specified In Hypotheses 24 And 26 (Study Two) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .022 .063 - 
Expertise .244** .066 .221** 
Explicit 
Support 
.073 .064 .071 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
-.068 .059 -.067 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 23. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation 
Model Specified In Hypothesis 24 And 26 (Study Two) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.888** .076 - 
Expertise .340** .082 .324** 
Explicit 
Support 
.863 .078 .835 
Expertise x 
Explicit 
Support 
.159 .081 .135 
Accessibility -.001 .077 -.001 
Explicit 
Support x 
Accessibility 
-.013 .080 -.012 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 24. Expertise Predicting Tolerance In Study Three 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.733** .092 - 
Expertise .392** .092 .261** 
R² .068 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 25. Implicit Democratic Values Support Predicting Tolerance In Study Three  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.733** .094 - 
Implicit 
Democratic 
Values 
Support 
.207* .094 .138* 
R² .019 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 26. Accessibility Predicting Tolerance In Study Three 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.733** .094 - 
Accessibility 
of Democratic 
Values 
Support 
.203* .094 .135* 
R² .018 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 27. Expertise Predicting Implicit Support In Study Three 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 6.203** .062 - 
Expertise .315** .061 .305** 
R² .093 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 28. Expertise Predicting Accessibility In Study Three 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .414** .023 - 
Expertise .013 .023 .035 
R² .001 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Figure 9. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise 
And Tolerance As Mediated By Implicit Democratic Values Support In Study Three 
(Without Controls) 
 
The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while 
controlling for implicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
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Figure 10. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise 
And Tolerance As Mediated By Implicit Democratic Values Support (When Controlling 
For Accessibility) In Study Three 
 
The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while 
controlling for explicit democratic values support is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
 
Figure 11. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise 
And Tolerance As Mediated By Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Three 
 
The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while 
controlling for accessibility is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01.  
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Figure 12. Standardized Regression Coefficients For The Relationship Between Expertise 
And Tolerance As Mediated By Accessibility Of Democratic Values In Study Three (While 
Controlling For Implicit Support) 
 
 
The standardized regression coefficient for expertise predicting tolerance while 
controlling for accessibility is in parentheses. *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
 
Figure 13. The Moderated Mediational Model Predicted By Hypotheses 36 And 39 (In 
Study Three) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
 
 
Table 29. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model 
Specified In Hypotheses 36 And 39 (Study Three) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .001 .060 - 
Expertise .306** .061 .287** 
Accessibility .023 .061 .018 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
.002 .064 .001 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 30. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation 
Model Specified In Hypothesis 36 And 39 (Study Three) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.727** .091 - 
Expertise .365** .096 .307** 
Accessibility -.215* .913 -.187* 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
.105 .099 .076 
Implicit 
Support 
.119 .096 .113 
Implicit 
Support x 
Accessibility 
-.187* .097 -.142 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Figure 14. The Moderated Mediation Model Predicted By Hypotheses 37 And 38 (In 
Study Three) 
 
 
 
Table 31. Regression Predicting The Mediator For The Moderated Mediation Model 
Specified In Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .008 .066 - 
Expertise .041 .067 .023 
Expertise x 
Implicit 
Support 
-.025 .060 -.017 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 32. Regression Predicting The Dependent Variable For The Moderated Mediation 
Model Specified In Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three) 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.66** .093 - 
Expertise .380** .094 .342** 
Implicit 
Support 
.236* .10 .219* 
Expertise x 
Implicit 
Support 
.243** .085 .220** 
Accessibility  -.197* .089 .184* 
Accessibility x 
Implicit 
Support 
-.182* .093 .163* 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 33. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In 
Hypotheses 37 And 38 (Study Three) 
Implicit 
Support 
Indirect 
Effect 
SE  Z P> Z 
-1 SD  -.001 .014 -.068 .945 
Mean  -.008 .015 -.094 .593 
- 1 SD  -.086* .037 -.163* .024 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 34. Indirect Effects As Specified By The Moderated Mediation Model In 
Hypotheses 36 And 39 (Study Three) 
Accessibility Indirect 
Effect 
SE  Z P> Z 
-1 SD  .0944+ .054 1.761 .078 
Mean  .0364 .031 1.178 .239 
- 1 SD  -.0208 .041 -.514 .608 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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APPENDIX B 
STATISTICAL TREATMENT DETAILS 
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Statistical Treatment Details 
Simple Mediation  
 As per Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure, simple mediation will be tested 
using the following three regression models, with expertise as X, tolerance as Y, and the 
mediator as M.  
1. Y = B1 + B2X + e1 
2. M= B3 + B4X + e2 
3. Y= B5 + B6X + B7M +e3 
To demonstrated mediation, the following four conditions must be met: 
1. In equation 1, there must be an overall effect of expertise on tolerance. B2 
must be significant.  
2. In equation 2, there must be an effect of the expertise on the mediator; B4 
must be significant.  
3. In equation 3, there must be an effect of the mediator on the DV when 
controlling for the IV; B7 must be significant.  
4. In equation 3, the effect of the IV on the DV must be reduced from the 
overall effect of the IV on the DV in equation 1.  
Condition 4 is satisfied by computing Sobel’s (1982) test. In the below equation a 
represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator (sa
2 is the 
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standard error of a), and b represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the 
mediator on the DV (sb is the standard error of b; note that the critical value for a 
two-tailed Sobel’s test at p<.05 is 1.96:  
z-value = a*b/SQRT (b2*sa
2 + a2*sb
2) 
If the Sobel’s test is significant at the p<.05 level, there is evidence of mediation.  
Simple Mediation with Controls 
 As per Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure, simple mediation will be tested 
using the following three regression models, with expertise as X, tolerance as Y, the 
control as C and the mediator as M.  
4. Y = B1 + B2X + B8C e1 
5. M= B3 + B4X + B9C e2 
6. Y= B5 + B6X + B7M + B10C +e3 
To demonstrated mediation, the following four conditions must be met: 
5. In equation 1, there must be an overall effect of expertise on tolerance. B2 
must be significant.  
6. In equation 2, there must be an effect of the expertise on the mediator; B4 
must be significant.  
7. In equation 3, there must be an effect of the mediator on the DV when 
controlling for the IV; B7 must be significant.  
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8. In equation 3, the effect of the IV on the DV must be reduced from the 
overall effect of the IV on the DV in equation 1.  
Condition 4 is satisfied by computing Sobel’s (1982) test. In the below equation a 
represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator (sa
2 is the 
standard error of a), and b represents the raw coefficient for the effect of the 
mediator on the DV (sb is the standard error of b; note that the critical value for a 
two-tailed Sobel’s test at p<.05 is 1.96:  
z-value = a*b/SQRT (b2*sa
2 + a2*sb
2) 
If the Sobel’s test is significant at the p<.05 level, there is evidence of mediation.  
Moderated Mediation: If Expertise and the Moderator are Uncorrelated (e.g., 
Hypothesis 10) 
As per Muller et al’s (2005) description of how to evaluate moderated 
mediation, predictors will be centered and entered into the three following regression 
equations, where X is the independent variable (expertise), Y is the dependent variable 
(tolerance), M is the mediator (explicit support for democratic norms), and W is the 
moderator (importance of democratic norms):  
Equation 1: Y = β1 + β2X + β3W + β4XW + ε1 
Equation 2: M = β5 + β6X + β7W + β8XW + ε2 
Equation 3: Y = β9 + β10X + β11W + β12XW + β13M + β14MW + ε3 
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Following Muller et al’s (2005) procedure, to have evidence of moderated 
mediation the following conditions must be met: 
1. The interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator (importance) in its 
effect on the DV (tolerance) must be nonsignificant in equation 1 (β4).  
2. At least one of the following must be evident:   
a. Either both the interaction between the IV (expertise) and the moderator 
(importance) must be significant predicting the mediator (explicit 
support; β8 in equation 2) and the effect of the mediator (explicit 
support) on the DV must be significant (β13 in equation 3). 
b. Both the effect of the IV (expertise) on the mediator (explicit support; β6 
in equation 2) and the interaction term between the mediator (explicit 
support) and the moderator (importance) on the DV (tolerance) must be 
significant (β14 in equation 3).  
If there is evidence of moderated mediation, the following regression can be 
used (with coefficients taken from the above equations) to calculate simple 
overall effects at different levels of the mediator (+1 and -1 standard deviation):  
β2 + β4W 
 The moderated indirect effect of the IV, via the mediator, is:  
 (β6 + β8W)(β13 + β14W) 
 The residual effect of the IV is: 
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 β10 + β12W 
 These equations can be used to estimate simple effects at high and low levels of 
the moderator.  
 If the prerequisites for moderated mediation are apparent using this procedure, 
indirect effects of the IV, via the mediator at high (+1 SD) and low (-1SD) levels of the 
moderator, (as per Preacher et al, 2007, Ng et al, 2008 & Muller et al, 2005). The 
resulting indirect effects tests are reported in a separate table in Appendix A. Note: in 
moderated mediation, the indirect effect score represents the portion of the relation 
between the IV and the DV that is accounted for the mediator (at that particular level of 
the moderator). Thus, a high, significant indirect effect score and corresponding z-score 
indicates that the effect of the IV on the DV has actually dropped in significance when 
the effect of the mediator has been included, and therefore is the functional equivalent 
of a Sobel’s test when testing moderated mediation (see Pearl, 2001, for a discussion of 
indirect and direct effects).  
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APPENDIX C 
TABLES AND FIGURES FOR ANALYSES WITH CONTROLS 
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Table 35. Expertise Predicting Explicit Democratic Values Support With Controls  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant -.442 .206 - 
Expertise .197* .071 .196* 
Participation .049 .045 .072 
Education .073+ .040 .123+ 
R² .091 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 36. Expertise Predicting Importance Of Democratic Values With Controls  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant -.515** .207 - 
Expertise .112 .068 .113 
Age .016** .006 .185** 
R² .032 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 37. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 10 With Controls  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant -.001** .062 - 
Expertise .263** .063 .167** 
Expertise x 
Importance 
-.066 .063 .056 
Education .072 .040 .065 
Participation .044 .046 .039 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 38. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 12 With Controls 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 4.073** .053 - 
Expertise .094* .055 .082* 
Importance .183** .057 .161** 
Expertise x 
Importance 
-.003 .056 .001 
Explicit 
Support 
-.219** .056 .184** 
Explicit 
Support x 
Importance 
-.191** .061 .185** 
Education .016 .034 .015 
Participation .021 .040 .019 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 39. Model Specified In Hypotheses 11 And 13 With Controls 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .0323** .068 - 
Expertise .023 .069 -.033 
Expertise x 
Explicit 
Support 
.074 .062 -.063 
Education .075 .046 .066 
Participation .039 .039 .034 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 40. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 11 And 13 With Controls 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 4.098** .055 - 
Expertise .091 .054 .082 
Importance .174* .057 .161* 
Expertise x 
Explicit 
Support 
.093 .050 .097 
Explicit 
Support 
-.239** .057 -.220** 
Explicit 
Support x 
Importance 
-.1890* .058 -.185* 
Education .016 .034 .012 
Participation .022 .040 .020 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 41. Expertise Predicting Tolerance With Controls In Study Two  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.264** .223 - 
Expertise .181* .087 .120* 
Explicit 
Democratic 
Values 
Support 
.843** .076 .559** 
Accessibility 
of Democratic 
Values 
-.007 .075 -.004 
Education .132** .047 .146** 
Participation .034 .035 .051 
R² .438 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 42. Expertise Predicting Accessibility With Controls In Study Two  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 1.165** .054 - 
Expertise .239** .057 .265** 
Explicit 
Democratic 
Values 
Support 
.076 .057 .084 
R² .092 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 43. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 24 With Controls  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .022 .063 - 
Expertise .244** .066 .221** 
Explicit 
Support 
.073 .064 .071 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
-.068 .059 -.067 
Education -.046 .040 -.043 
Participation .009 .030 .008 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 44. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 26 With Controls 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.888** .076 - 
Expertise .340** .082 .324** 
Explicit 
Support 
.863 .078 .835 
Expertise x 
Explicit 
Support 
.159 .081 .135 
Accessibility -.001 .077 -.001 
Explicit 
Support x 
Accessibility 
-.013 .080 -.012 
Education .130 .047 .122 
Participation .031 .035 .029 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 45. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 23 With Controls 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .058 .061 - 
Expertise .269** .062 .188** 
Accessibility .126 .063 .132 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
-.198** .062 .195** 
Education -.036 .39 -.33 
Participation .039 .029 .037 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 46. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 25 With Controls  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.888** .076 - 
Expertise .340** .082 .324** 
Explicit 
Support 
.863 .078 .835 
Expertise x 
Explicit 
Support 
.159 .081 .135 
Accessibility -.001 .077 -.001 
Explicit 
Support x 
Accessibility 
-.013 .080 -.012 
Education .130 .047 .121 
Participation .035 .035 .026 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 47. Expertise Predicting Tolerance With Controls In Study Three  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.468** .380 - 
Expertise .244* .103 .162* 
Implicit 
Democratic 
Values 
Support 
.038 .095 .025 
Accessibility 
of Democratic 
Values 
.195* .091* -.130* 
Education .047 .060 .050 
Participation .117* .047 .175* 
Ideology -.101 .061 -.103 
R² .141 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 48. Expertise Predicting Accessibility With Controls In Study Three 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .291** .055 - 
Expertise .015 .023 .043 
Ideology .036** .015 .153** 
R² .025 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 49. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 36 With Controls 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .001 .060 - 
Expertise .306** .061 .287** 
Accessibility .023 .061 .018 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
.002 .064 .001 
Ideology -.069 .041 -.051 
Participation .059 .031 .057 
Education -.044 .040 -.039 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 50. Regression Specified In Hypothesis 39 With Controls  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.727** .091 - 
Expertise .365** .096 .307** 
Accessibility -.215* .913 -.187* 
Expertise x 
Accessibility 
.105 .099 .076 
Implicit 
Support 
.119 .096 .113 
Implicit 
Support x 
Accessibility 
-.187* .097 -.142 
Ideology -.096 .061 -.088 
Participation .122 .047 .109 
Education .045 .056 .452 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
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Table 51. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 37 With Controls.  
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant .008 .066 - 
Expertise .041 .067 .023 
Expertise x 
Implicit 
Support 
-.025 .060 -.017 
Ideology .108 .060 .092 
Education -.040 .042 -.036 
Participation .044 .033 .042 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level. 
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
Table 52. Regression Specified In Hypotheses 38 With Controls 
Variable Model 1 
 B SE B β 
Constant 3.66** .093 - 
Expertise .380** .094 .342** 
Implicit 
Support 
.236* .10 .219* 
Expertise x 
Implicit 
Support 
.243** .085 .220** 
Accessibility  -.197* .089 .184* 
Accessibility x 
Implicit 
Support 
-.182* .093 .163* 
Ideology -.110 .046 -.102 
Participation .109 .045 .089 
Education .042 .060 .044 
+ marginally significant at p<.10 level 
* significant at the p<.05 level.   
** significant at the p<.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
REFERENCE LIST 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple Regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173–1182. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173 
 
Blank, T., & Schmidt, P. (2003). National Identity in a United Germany: Nationalism or 
Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Representative Data. Political Psychology, 24(2), 289–
312. doi:10.1111/0162-895X.00329 
 
Bobo, L. &Licari, F. (1989). Education and political tolerance: testing the effects of    cognitive 
sophistication and target group affect. Public Opinion Quarterly, 53 
 
Boninger, D. S., Krosnick, J. A., & Berent, M. K. (1995). Origins of attitude importance: Self-
interest, social identification, and value relevance. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(1), 61–80. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.1.61 
 
Bosson, J. K., Swann, W. B., &Pennebaker, J. W. (2000). Stalking the perfect measure of 
implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited? Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 79(4), 631–643. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.4.631 
 
Carpini, M. X. D., & Keeter, S. (1993). Measuring Political Knowledge: Putting First Things 
First. American Journal of Political Science, 37(4), 1179–1206. doi:10.2307/2111549 
 
Carpini, M. X. D., & Keeter, S. (1996). What Americans Know About Politics and Why It 
Matters. Yale University Press. 
 
Chandler, C. R., & Tsai, Y. (2001). Social factors influencing immigration attitudes: an analysis 
of data from the General Social Survey. The Social Science Journal, 38(2), 177–188. 
doi:10.1016/S0362-3319(01)00106-9 
 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996b). Dispositional 
differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in need for 
cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119(2), 197–253. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.197 
159 
 
 
 
Chanley, V. (1994). Commitment to political tolerance: Situation and activity-based 
differences. Political Behavior, 16(3). 
 
Coenders, M., &Scheepers, P. (2003). The Effect of Education on Nationalism and Ethnic 
Exclusionism: An International Comparison. Political Psychology, 24(2), 313–343. 
doi:10.1111/0162-895X.00330 
 
Corneo, G., & Jeanne, O. (2009).A theory of tolerance. Journal of Public Economics, 93(5-6), 
691–702. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.02.005 
 
Davis, D. W., & Silver, B. D. (2004). Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of 
the Terrorist Attacks on America. American Journal of Political Science, 48(1), 28–46. 
doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00054.x 
 
Devine, P.G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and controlled components. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56(1) 5-18. 
 
Duch, R. M., & Gibson, J. L. (1992a).“Putting Up With” Fascists in Western Europe: A 
Comparative, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance. The Western Political Quarterly, 
45(1), 237–273. doi:10.2307/448773 
 
Evera, S. van.(1994). Hypotheses on Nationalism and War. International Security, 18(4), 5–39. 
doi:10.2307/2539176 
 
Fazio, R. H. & Williams, C. J. (1986). Attitude accessibility as a moderator of the attitude-
perception and attitude-behavior relations: an investigation of the 1984 presidential 
election. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(3) 505-514. 
 
Fazio, R.H. (2001). On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: an overview. 
Cognition and Emotion, 15(2) 115-141.  
 
Gibson, J.L. & Bingham, R.D. (1982).On the conceptualization and measurement of political 
tolerance. The American Political Science Review, 76(3). 
 
Gibson, J.L. (1987). Homosexuals and the Ku Klux Klan: A contextual analysis of political 
intolerance. Western Political Quarterly, 40. 
 
Gibson, B. S. (1996). The masking account of attentional capture: A reply to Yantis and 
Jonides (1996). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 22(6), 1514–1520. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.22.6.1514 
160 
 
 
 
Gibson, J. L. (1988). Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red 
Scare. The American Political Science Review, 82(2), 511–529. doi:10.2307/1957398 
 
Gibson, J. L. (1989). Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, 
and Political Tolerance. Law & Society Review, 23(3), 469–496. doi:10.2307/3053830 
 
Gibson, J. L. (1996). The paradoxes of political tolerance in processes of democratization. 
Politikon, 23(2), 5–21. doi:10.1080/02589349608705033 
 
Gibson, J. L., & Bingham, R. D. (1982).On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political 
Tolerance. The American Political Science Review, 76(3), 603–620. doi:10.2307/1963734 
 
Gibson, J. L., & Gouws, A. (2008a). Making Tolerance Judgments: The Effects of Context, Local 
and National. The Journal of Politics, 63(04). doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00101 
 
Gibson, J. L., & Gouws, A. (2008b). Making Tolerance Judgments: The Effects of Context, Local 
and National. The Journal of Politics, 63(04). doi:10.1111/0022-3816.00101 
 
Golebiowska, E. A. (1999). Gender Gap in Political Tolerance. Political Behavior, 21(1), 43–66. 
doi:10.2307/586585 
 
Green-Demers, I., Legault, L., Pelletier, D., & Pelletier, L. G. (2008).Factorial Invariance of the 
Academic Amotivation Inventory (AAI) Across Gender and Grade in a Sample of 
Canadian High School Students. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 68(5), 
862–880. doi:10.1177/0013164407313368 
 
Greenwald, A. G., &Farnham, S. D. (2000).Using the Implicit Association Test to measure self-
esteem and self-concept. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(6), 1022–
1038. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.1022 
 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring individual differences 
in implicit cognition: The implicit association test.Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74(6), 1464–1480. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464 
 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., &Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the Implicit 
Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85(2), 197–216. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.197 
 
Guterman, N. (1990). Voltaire’s letter to M. le Riche. A Book of French Quotations. New York, 
NY: Anchor. 
161 
 
 
 
Huddy, L., Feldman, S., Taber, C., & Lahav, G. (2005). Threat, Anxiety, and Support of 
Antiterrorism Policies. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 593–608. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00144.x 
 
Hutchison, M. (2007).The contextual elements of political tolerance: a multilevel analysis of 
the effects of threat environment and domestic institutions on political tolerance levels. 
University of Kentucky Doctoral Dissertations. Retrieved from 
http://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/521 
 
Jackman, M. R. (1978). General and Applied Tolerance: Does Education Increase 
Commitment to Racial Integration? American Journal of Political Science, 22(2), 302–
324. doi:10.2307/2110618 
 
Jefferson, T. (1944) as cited in EM Betts (eds), Thomas Jefferson's Garden Book. 1944. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press.  
 
Krosnick, J. A. (1988). The role of attitude importance in social evaluation: A study of policy 
preferences, presidential candidate evaluations, and voting behavior. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 55(2), 196–210. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.2.196 
 
Krosnick, J. A. (1989). Attitude importance and attitude accessibility. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 15(3) 297-308.  
 
Krosnick, J. A., & Kinder, D. R. (1990). Altering the Foundations of Support for the President 
Through Priming. The American Political Science Review, 84(2), 497–512. 
doi:10.2307/1963531 
 
Kuklinski, J.H., Riggle, E., Ottati, V., Schwarz, N., & Wyer, R.S. (1991). The cognitive and 
affective bases of political tolerance judgments. American Journal of Political Science, 
35(1-27). 
 
Kuklinski, J.H., Riggle, E., Ottati, V., Schwarz, N., & Wyer, R.S. (1993).  Thinking about political 
tolerance, more or less, with more or less information. In G. Marcus & R. Hanson (Eds.), 
Reconsidering the Democratic Public (225-248), University Park, PA: Penn State 
University Press. 
 
Lepore, L & Brown, R. (2002). The role of awareness: Divergent automatic stereotype 
activation and implicit judgment correction. Social Cognition, 20(4). 
 
MacKinnon, D. (2012). Introduction to Statistical Mediation Analysis. Routledge. 
162 
 
 
 
Marcus, G.E., Sullivan, J.L., Theiss-Morse, E. & Wood, S.L. (1995).With malice toward some: 
How people make civil liberties judgments. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Marcus, G. E., Sullivan, J. L., Theiss-Morse, E., & Stevens, D. (2005). The Emotional 
Foundation of Political Cognition: The Impact of Extrinsic Anxiety on the Formation of 
Political Tolerance Judgments. Political Psychology, 26(6), 949–963. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9221.2005.00452.x 
 
McClosky, H & Brill, A. (1983). Dimensions of tolerance: What Americans believe about civil 
liberties. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
 
McClosky, H. & Zaller, J. (1984).The American Ethos: public attitudes toward capitalism and 
democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
McClosky, H. (1964). Consensus and ideology in American politics. The American Political 
Science Review, 58(2). 
 
Mill, J.S. (1982) On Liberty. London, England: Penguin Classics.  
 
McHugo, G. J., Lanzetta, J. T., Sullivan, D. G., Masters, R. D., &Englis, B. G. (1985).Emotional 
reactions to a political leader’s expressive displays. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 49(6), 1513–1529. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.49.6.1513 
 
Mummendey, A., Klink, A., & Brown, R. (2001a). Nationalism and patriotism: National 
identification and out-group rejection. British Journal of Social Psychology, 40(2), 159–
172. doi:10.1348/014466601164740 
 
Muller, D., Judd, C. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2005). When moderation is mediated and mediation 
is moderated. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 852–863. 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.852 
 
Nelson, T. E., Clawson, R. A., & Oxley, Z. M. (1997).Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict 
and Its Effect on Tolerance. The American Political Science Review, 91(3), 567–583. 
doi:10.2307/2952075 
 
Ng, K.-Y., Ang, S., & Chan, K.-Y. (2008). Personality and leader effectiveness: A moderated 
mediation model of leadership self-efficacy, job demands, and job autonomy. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 93(4), 733–743. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.93.4.733 
 
163 
 
 
 
Nie, N. H., Junn, J., &Stehlik-Barry, K. (1996).Education and Democratic Citizenship in 
America. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Noelle-Neumann, E. (1998). A shift from the right to the left as an indicator of value change: 
a battle for the climate of opinion. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 
10(4), 317–334. doi:10.1093/ijpor/10.4.317 
 
Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002).Harvesting implicit group attitudes and 
beliefs from a demonstration web site. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 
6(1), 101–115. doi:10.1037/1089-2699.6.1.101 
 
Nunn, C., Crockett, H. & Williams, J. (1978).Tolerance for noncomformity. Hoboken, NJ: 
Jossey Bass Inc Publishing.  
 
Pearl, J. (2001). Direct and indirect effects. In Proceedings of the Seventeenth Conference on 
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (pp. 411–420). San Francisco, CA, USA: Morgan 
Kaufmann Publishers Inc. Retrieved from 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2074022.2074073 
 
Peffley, M., &Rohrschneider, R. (2003). Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen 
Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning. Political Research Quarterly, 
56(3), 243–257. doi:10.1177/106591290305600301 
 
Peffley, Mark, &Sigelman, L. (1990). Intolerance of Communists during the McCarthy Era: A 
General Model. The Western Political Quarterly, 43(1), 93–111. doi:10.2307/448507 
 
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (2007). Addressing Moderated Mediation 
Hypotheses: Theory, Methods, and Prescriptions. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 
42(1), 185–227. doi:10.1080/00273170701341316 
 
Price, E.D. & Ottati, V. (2012, July).The Flexible Deliberation Model. Paper presented to the 
annual meeting of the International Society for Political Psychology, Chicago, IL 
Prothro, J.W. & Grigg, C.M. (1960). Fundamental principles of democracy: Bases of 
agreement and disagreement. Journal of Politics, 22(2). 
 
Putnam, R. D. (2001). Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community. 
Simon& Schuster. 
 
164 
 
 
 
Rudman, L. A., Ashmore, R. D., & Gary, M. L. (2001). “Unlearning” automatic biases: The 
malleability of implicit prejudice and stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 81(5), 856–868. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.856 
 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000).Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68 
 
Shamir, M. (1991). Political Intolerance among Masses and Elites in Israel: A Reevaluation of 
the Elitist Theory of Democracy. The Journal of Politics, 53(4), 1018–1043. 
doi:10.2307/2131865 
 
Shamir, M., & Sullivan, J. L. (1985a). Jews and Arabs in Israel: Everybody Hates Somebody, 
Sometime. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(2), 283–305. doi:10.2307/174102 
 
Shamir, M., & Sullivan, J. L. (1985b). Jews and Arabs in Israel: Everybody Hates Somebody, 
Sometime. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(2), 283–305. doi:10.2307/174102 
 
Sniderman, P. M. (1975). Personality Demo Pol. University of California Press. 
 
Stouffer, S. (1955).Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction.  
 
Sullivan, J. L., & Marcus, G. E. (1988).A Note on “Trends in Political Tolerance. “The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 52(1), 26–32. doi:10.2307/2749109 
 
Sullivan, J. L., Walsh, P., Shamir, M., Barnum, D. G., & Gibson, J. L. (1993). Why Politicians Are 
More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization among Political Elites in Britain, 
Israel, New Zealand and the United States. British Journal of Political Science, 23(1), 51–
76. doi:10.2307/194067 
 
Sullivan, J.L. & Transue, J.E. (1999). The psychological underpinnings of democracy: A 
selective review of research on political tolerance, interpersonal trust and social capital. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 50(1) 
 
Sullivan, J.L., Piereson, J. & Marcus, G.E. (1982).Political tolerance and American democracy. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Theiss-Morse, E. (1993). Conceptualizations of good citizenship and political participation. 
Political Behavior, 15(4). 
165 
 
 
 
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., &Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering 
the social group:  A self-categorization theory (Vol. x). Cambridge,  MA,  US: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Weldon, S. A. (2006). The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A 
Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe. American Journal of Political 
Science, 50(2), 331–349. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00187.x 
 
Zaller, J. (1990). Political Awareness, Elite Opinion Leadership, and the Mass Survey 
Response. Social Cognition, 8(1), 125–153. doi:10.1521/soco.1990.8.1.125 
 
 
166 
 
VITA 
 Erika Price spent the first eighteen years of her life in Cleveland, Ohio. She 
attended The Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio, from 2006 to 2009, attaining a 
Bachelors of Arts’ degree in Psychology and Political Science. She then continued her 
education by enrolling in Loyola University Chicago’s Applied Social Psychology PhD 
program.  
 At Loyola, Dr. Price studied social psychology, statistics, program evaluation, and 
research methodology. She worked on research projects in several Loyola faculty 
psychology labs, overseeing experiments on political candidate evaluation, stereotype 
threat, social cognition, persuasion, and romantic relationship functioning.  She worked 
as a program evaluator and statistical consultant for clients such as Chicago Public 
Schools, Cook County Jail, Loyola University’s College of Social Work, Loyola University’s 
School of Nursing, DePaul University, and the Chicago Police Department. She also 
worked as an adjunct faculty member at Loyola, teaching several courses in Social 
Psychology Lab, Statistics, and Social Psychology. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
